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I. STATUS
A. CEREMONIAL MARRIAGE
N 1995 the Legislature enacted Family Code section 1.045 to require
an applicant for a marriage license to submit a sworn statement wit-
nessed by two persons that the applicant does not owe delinquent
court-ordered child-support.1 The section goes on to make an intention-
ally false statement in that regard a jail-felony.2 The Legislature also
amended section 1.07(a)(1) 3 to provide that a county clerk shall not issue
a marriage license if either applicant fails to comply with section 1.045.
Thus, the failure of either applicant to file such a statement would cause
the denial of the license. The District Attorneys of Dallas and Howard
Counties asked the Texas Attorney General whether these provisions are
constitutional.
Relying on the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Zablocki v. Redhail,4 dealing with a somewhat similar Wisconsin statute
and decisions of courts in Utah5 and Indiana 6 following that decision, the
1. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §1.045 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
2. Id.
3. Id. § 1.07(a)(1).
4. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
5. Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060, 1069-70 (C.D. Utah 1987).
6. Miller v. Morris, 386 N.E.2d 1203, 1204-05 (Ind. 1979).
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Texas Attorney General expressed the opinion7 that the 1995 amend-
ments violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution as infringing the right to marry. The
1995 act should, therefore, be repealed.
The Texas Attorney General also expressed the opinion that a Texas
judge may perform a marriage ceremony under Family Code section
1.83(a)(4)(j) during regular office hours and use public resources, includ-
ing public property and public employees in doing so. The Attorney
General also reiterated that the judge may keep a fee charged for per-
forming a marriage ceremony.8
B. INFORMAL MARRIAGE
In response to a woman's contention that she is the common-law wife
of a decedent, evidence is sometimes offered that the man had asserted,
during the alleged marriage, that he was single. Such evidence may be
the man's federal income tax return filed as a single person, but that sort
of evidence may not be decisive of the issue before the court.9 In
Dalworth Trucking Co. v. Bulen' the negative evidence of the decedent's
marital status was his insurance benefits card which indicated, presuma-
bly in reflection of his application for insurance from his employer, that
he was "divorced" and that he designated his mother and son as his insur-
ance beneficiaries." In this instance, however, the appellate court made
no mention of the date of the insurance application or indeed whether it
was put into evidence. 12 There was copious direct evidence that the man
had told witnesses that he and his ex-wife had agreed to be married and
were again married, after they had been divorced.13 The sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's verdict of an informal marriage was
thereby sustained in a contest focused both on the agreement of marriage
and the couple's representation to the public that they were married. 14
Asserting an informal marriage, the alleged widow in Shepherd v. Led-
ford15 brought a wrongful death action against her alleged husband's phy-
sicians for medical malpractice. The parties stipulated that the plaintiff
was the informal wife of the decedent. The defendants, nevertheless,
7. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-384 (1996). In the course of his opinion the Attorney
General noted that there are more effective means of enforcing court-ordered child-sup-
port: "See e.g., Fam. Code chs. 157 (enforcement of child support orders), 158 (withholding
from earnings for child support), 231 (Title IV-D program), 232 (suspension of license for
failure to pay child support)."
8. Id. (citing Moore v. Sheppard, 144 Tex. 537, 192 S.W.2d 559 (1946); Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. JM-22 (1983); TEX. LOCAL GoV'T CODE § 154.005 (1988)).
9. See In re Estate of Giessel, 734 S.W.2d 27 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Winfield v. Renfro, 821 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991,
writ denied).
10. 924 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
11. Id. at 736.
12. Id. at 737.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 926 S.W.2d 405 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ granted).
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contested the plaintiff's standing to sue in light of the then-controlling
provisions of section 1.91 of the Family Code. 16 The defendants asserted
that, under those provisions, by waiting more than one year after the al-
leged marriage to assert it, the plaintiff was precluded from asserting the
marriage. The court rejected this argument on the ground that the two
years statute of limitation for bringing an action for wrongful death 17
made any other statutes irrelevant by its own terms. The court also held
that the parties' stipulation had precluded any attack on the validity of
the marriage.
Jordan v. Jordan18 is a case of only minor significance but with enor-
mously complicated facts. The husband, whose estate was claimed by two
women as his widow, was first married in 1957. In 1960 he abandoned his
first wife in favor of another woman. The second woman was then mar-
ried to a man in prison. As far as the findings of fact revealed, she re-
mained married to him until he died in 1995, though the court noted that
the prisoner might have divorced her at some time in the interval. The
man whose estate was in issue nevertheless apparently thought that he
was married to the second woman at some time because he successfully
sued her for divorce in July, 1985, though she was evidently incapable of
marrying him in the '60s and he could not have married her until his first
wife divorced him in June, 1965. At that point an invalid informal mar-
riage might have ripened into a valid marriage under Family Code section
2.2219 if the man and the second woman were then living together as hus-
band and wife and if the second woman's prior marriage to the prisoner
had been terminated. The man whose estate was in issue nevertheless
entered into a ceremonial marriage with a third woman in July, 1965. The
man ceased living with the third woman in 1970 and began an apparent
informal union with a fourth woman in 1979. He was still living with the
fourth woman when he died in 1993. The fourth woman claimed the de-
cedent's estate as his widow and the third woman sought to refute that
claim. The contest was tried to a jury. Evidently on the basis of his own
partial fact-finding, the trial judge directed a verdict for the third woman
and the fourth woman appealed.
The appellate court held 20 that because of the facts in dispute, the di-
rected verdict was improper. The resolution of the dispute between the
third and fourth women as the decedent's widow turned on whether the
man had ever been married to the second woman.21 If he had been mar-
16. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1.91(b) (Vernon 1985), repealed and replaced in 1995
with TEX. FAM. CODE ANN § 1.91(b) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590(1), § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1997). The court
also sustained the widow's right to sue on behalf of the decedent's estate under the survival
statute, TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (b) (Vernon 1986), in the absence of
any descendant or the commencement of any proceeding in the probate court. Shepherd,
926 S.W.2d at 414.
18. 938 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, n.w.h.).
19. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.22 (Vernon 1993).
20. Jordan, 938 S.W.2d at 180.
21. Id. at 179.
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ried to her after he was divorced by his first wife but before his ceremo-
nial marriage to the third woman, the marriage to the third woman could
not have been valid because the man had ceased living with her prior to
his divorce from his second wife in 1985. Fact issues clearly remained to
be determined on remand to the trial court.
One judge concurred in the court's order to remand to the trial court
rather than to render judgment in favor of the fourth woman, because the
fourth woman's pleadings did not warrant her reliance on the doctrine of
res judicata and invalidity of the marriage to the second woman.22 The
concurring judge concluded that if the third woman had pled res judicata
and voidness of the second marriage (because the man's 1985 divorce
decree stated that he had been married to the second woman and had
lived with her until August, 1965), the third woman (as a claimant from
the decedent) would have been barred from asserting her claim23 in that
she was claiming from the man who was a party to that proceeding.
C. STATE EMPLOYMENT
In expressing an opinion concerning the law against nepotism in state
employment the Texas Attorney General restated 24 the general rules that
"statutory nepotism prohibitions apply only to officers who have actual
statutory authority to hire personnel"2 5 and that "statutory nepotism
prohibitions do not apply if [a] relative of [a] member of [a] governing
board is hired for [a] position authorized by that body when [the] gov-
erning body does not exercise control over [the] person to be selected. 26
Put affirmatively, the nepotism prohibition 27 was considered applicable
when a school-board considered rehiring a former school-district em-
ployee who was related to a school-board member within a prohibited
degree and prior to resignation had been continuously employed by the
school-district at the time of the school-board member's election.28
In 1995 the Legislature made an addition to the Government Code29
providing that a person is not eligible to serve on the board of trustees of
the state's Teacher Retirement System if that person or that person's
spouse "receives a substantial amount of ... funds from the retirement
system .... -"3o The Texas Attorney General expressed the opinion that a
board member's service since appointment in 1991 is covered by that pro-
vision when his wife had since retired and was receiving an annuity from
the system.31 If such a board member does not resign, he is subject to
22. See id. at 180 (Cohen, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 180.
24. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-052 (1996).
25. Citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. DM-208 (1993).
26. Citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H-697 (1975).
27. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 573.062 (Vernon 1994).
28. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-015 (1996).
29. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 825.0032(a)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1997).
30. Id.
31. Tex. Att'y Gen. LO-142 (1996).
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removal by action of the attorney general or the governor.3 2
D. Loss OF CONSORTIUM
In Motor Express, Inc. v. Rodriguez33 the Supreme Court of Texas
noted that although "there may be certain relationships that give rise to a
duty which, if breached, would support an emotional distress award even
absent proof of physical injury ... the landowner-invitee relationship is
not one."' 34 Because the claimant husband could not recover mental-
anguish damages as a matter of law, his wife's derivative claim for loss of
consortium was also barred. 35
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. PERSONAL QUALITIES
Although most of the very recent decision on the characterization of
marital property dealt with definitional matters reflecting the literal lan-
guage of article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution, 36 the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals relied on decisional law to reiterate the
proposition that the financial worth of personal characteristics as exem-
plified by the goodwill of professional practice constitutes separate prop-
erty.37 Since the Texas Supreme Court confirmed the holding of the
court of appeals in Amarillo in that regard in Nail v. NaiP8 in 1972, the
principle has been generally followed in that context 39 and by analogy in
relation to the acquisition of professional skills during marriage.40 In
other instances,4 however, the holding in Nail has been distinguished
when the value of professional goodwill of a closely held corporation or
large corporate entity was not directly attributable to the spouse-share-
holder, who was one of many employees of the business. The acid test for
the rule will be the instance when it is asserted that a portion of the sales
price of a professional practice or wholly owned professional corporation,
32. Id. See generally TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 665 (Vernon 1994) (procedures for
removal from office).
33. 925 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam).
34. Id. at 639 (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 600 (Tex. 1993)).
35. Id. at 640. In Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 928 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1995, writ granted), the court rejected a challenge of a $500,000 award for a
wife's loss of consortium for a husband's serious head injury that produced radical emo-
tional changes in the husband.
36. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
37. Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d 830, 851 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ
requested).
38. 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972).
39. Guzman v. Guzman, 827 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ de-
nied); Finn v. Finn, 658 S.W.2d 735, 742 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
also Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
46 SMU L. REV. 1475, 1484-86 (1993).
40. Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1980, writ
dism'd).




developed and sold during marriage, is for professional goodwill and is
therefore separate property.42
B. INCEPTION OF TITLE
By constitutional definition,43 reflecting the rule of Spanish law 44 appli-
cable to the province of Texas and the Mexican state of Coahuila y Texas
prior to the American migration and since expounded by Texas courts,
property acquired prior to marriage is a spouse's separate property, even
if the property is intended to be the family home, little or none of the
purchase price is paid prior to marriage, and a part of the purchase price
is discharged during marriage.45
In Leighton v. Leighton46 the husband had acquired a ranch prior to
marriage; therefore, it was his separate property. During marriage the
realty was substantially improved by expenditure of funds borrowed by
both spouses who put a lien on the ranch by deed of trust as security for
the loan. The divorce court concluded that the execution of the deed of
trust had somehow achieved a resulting trust in favor of the community
estate so that the ranch might be divided between the spouses. The court
of appeals reversed this curious conclusion.47 The husband's separate
property maintained its separate character through the life of the
transaction.
A lump sum award for a workers' compensation settlement for premar-
ital injury was similarly analyzed by the Texas Supreme Court in Lewis v.
Lewis, 48 though the entire payment of the settlement occurred during
marriage. Without hearing oral argument, the court reversed and re-
manded the case to the court of appeals. A portion of the workers' com-
pensation benefits had been used to buy a tract of land. Relying on the
decision of the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals in Hicks v. Hicks,49 the
Eastland court had affirmed a divorce decree,50 treating the compensa-
42. In such cases, of course, the sale is usually accompanied by a covenant not to
compete, which will ordinarily entail a significant reduction in immediate earning power
that after divorce would be treated as separate property. See also Crystal L. Landes, Com-
ment, The Story of Convenants Not to Compete in Texas Continues... , 33 Hous. L. REV.
913 (1996).
43. TEX. CONST. of 1845, art. VII, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
44. FUERO REAL 111.3.3 (1255); RECOP. V.9.4 (1567); Nov. REC. X.4.3 (1805).
45. See Dawson v. Dawson, 767 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1989, no writ);
Carter v. Carter, 736 S.W.2d 775 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Roach
v. Roach, 672 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, no writ); Wierzchula v. Wierzchula,
623 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, no writ).
46. 921 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. App.-Houston fist Dist.] 1996, no writ).
47. Id. at 367-68 (citing Bybee v. Bybee, 644 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1982, no writ).
48. 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 359 (Feb. 21, 1997) (per curiam), rev'g Lewis v. Lewis, 923
S.W.2d 837 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996).
49. 546 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ), discussed along with Andrle
v. Andrle, 751 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App. -Eastland 1988, writ denied), in Joseph W. Mc-
Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 43 Sw. L.J. 1, 8-9
(1989).
50. Lewis, 923 S.W.2d at 839.
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tion award and thus the land as community property under Family Code
section 5.01(a)(3). 51 Although the decision of the Eastland court was
clearly wrong, the Texas Supreme Court's brief per curiam reversal may
be misconstrued.
In 1961 the Supreme Court of Texas held that the sole purpose of the
Texas workers' compensation scheme is to compensate for loss of earning
capacity. 52 If it can be assumed that legislative purpose had not been
changed in that regard through subsequent amendments of the system,
53
that policy still controls the interpretation of the Texas statute.
54 Thus
any recovery for pain and suffering is excluded from an award under the
workers' compensation acts. Hence, if a worker is temporarily injured
when married, receives a workers' compensation award for his lost earn-
ing power, is thereafter divorced, and continues to receive payments
while single following his divorce, those later payments as substitutes for
lost compensation after divorce are his separate property.55 In this re-
spect the characterization of workers' compensation benefits is similar to
that of retirement benefits, which are classified as deferred earnings. The
principal difference is that retirement benefits are ordinarily paid from
funds that are put aside during a period while the employee was married
part of the time and single part of the time. In the case of workers' com-
pensation benefits, however, the payments can be characterized by the
marital status of the employee when he is paid because the payments
represent current lost earnings.5 6 In this respect the workers' compensa-
tion insurance scheme operates at the public level in a manner similar to
a private insurance contract providing for loss of property. The recovery
takes the same character as the property destroyed. 57 At this point in its
analysis of the dispute in Lewis v. Lewis58 the Eastland court had gone
astray in explaining its own decision in Andrle v. Andrle.59
Reversing the Eastland court's conclusion in Lewis, the Texas Supreme
Court held that a workers' compensation settlement paid in a lump sum
during marriage for a permanent disability suffered while the injured
worker was single was separate property because the loss of earning ca-
pacity occurred before the disabled worker married. 60 This terse analysis
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1993).
52. Employers' Reinsurance Corp. v. Holland, 162 Tex. 394, 395, 347 S.W.2d 605, 606
(1961).
53. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306 to 8309-1 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1997).
54. The same purpose is said to motivate other American workers' compensation acts.
See 2 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.10 (1981).
55. Hicks v. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d 71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
56. Id. at 73-74.
57. Rolater v. Rolater, 198 S.W. 391, 392-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1917, no writ).
58. 923 S.W.2d 837,839 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996), rev'd per curiam, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 359 (Feb. 21, 1997).
59. 751 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1988, writ denied). An earlier effort was
made to explain the decision in Andrle differently and thus to conform it to other prece-
dents. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 43 SMU L. REV. 1, 9 (1989). But in Lewis, the Eastland Court persisted in making its
error more explicit.
60. Lewis, 40 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 360.
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is apt to be misunderstood. Further amplification would explain that
when a worker receives a lump-sum settlement award for permanent in-
jury while single (although the award is actually paid when the worker is
married), as a matter of law the burden of proof is on the spouse who
would show that part of the award is community property, because the
award was for a loss which occurred while the worker was single. The
wife in Lewis could not discharge that burden of proof. A very different
burden of proof could be discharged by a wife who claimed a share of
benefits for a temporary injury received while single but paid during mar-
riage for present loss of earning power.61 Regrettably the court sup-
ported its argument in Lewis with two decisions which have been long
since discountenanced: one by the Texas Supreme Court itself62 and the
other63 by the Legislature by enactment of section 4.03 of the Family
Code. 64 More fully explained, however, the court's decision is easy to
apply. The premarital lump-sum recovery for physical loss in Lewis had
no provable nexus to loss of earning power during the marriage and was
therefore the recipient's separate property.65
With regard to characterization of benefits under an insurance agent's
contract of employment, the Texarkana court's decision in In re Wade66 is
not unlike that in numerous unmatured retirement benefit cases in de-
parting from the inception of title rule in favor of an analysis recognizing
such payments as deferred wages.67 For a short time prior to marriage
and during his marriage the husband was employed as an insurance
agent. During marriage, he entered into a contract with his employer by
which on termination of employment the husband would be paid an an-
nual amount for five years based on his total commissions for the year
preceding termination. The agent's commissions were largely attributa-
ble to the renewal of policies previously sold by the agent and were thus
61. Hicks, 546 S.W.2d at 73-74.
62. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v. Few, 456 S.W.2d 156, 160 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 463 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. 1971). See Joseph W. McKnight, Fam-
ily Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 45 (1971).
63. General Ins. Co. v. Casper, 426 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968 writ
ref'd n.r.e.). See Joseph W. McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
23 Sw. L.J. 44, 55 (1969).
64. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.03 (Vernon 1993), initially enacted as TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. art. 4621 (effective Jan. 1, 1968).
65. In Newsom v. Petrilli, 919 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ), a
suit for reformation of a divorce decree, the ex-husband attempted to liken what were
termed "disability benefits" under his retirement plan to workers' compensation payments
identifiable as payments for premarital loss of wages, citing Bonar v. Bonar, 614 S.W.2d
472, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Although some of the husband's
physical disability could be traced to a premarital head injury, his generally disabled condi-
tion was attributable to a "deterioration occurring through the years" of marriage and the
postmarital period before the suit was brought. Id. The term "disability" as used in the
state firemen's pension scheme is apparently a synonym for any identifiable physical mal-
ady that allows increased pension benefits to the pensioner. Id. at 485.
66. 923 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, writ denied).
67. There was inconclusive but strong dicta on the character of insurance agents' re-
newal commissions in Vibrock v. Vibrock, 549 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth), writ ref'd n.r.e., reserving judgment on the point, 561 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. 1977).
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clearly a form of deferred compensation. The court rejected the hus-
band's argument that his contract related to his premarital employment
contract, the terms of which were not in evidence. The appellate court
remanded the case for a determination of a possible premarital separate
interest in the deferred compensation as well as an evaluation of the
wife's interest in all the contractual benefits at the time of divorce: "the
amount of benefits the earning spouse would receive on the date of di-
vorce if he ... were eligible for the benefits on that date" 68 under Berry v.
Berry.69 The court observed that once findings are made regarding the
total number of years of benefits accrued, their proportional character as
separate and community property, and their value, there would be no
further conditions unsatisfied under the Berry formula and no need to
make an order for division of the benefits if and when received by the
husband. 70
C. TRUST INCOME
Because income from separate property is community property of the
spouses under Texas law, cash dividends on stock and the revenues from
annual crops, as well as longer term crops such as timber,71 are commu-
nity property. Income from a trust created for the benefit of a spouse has
presented an especially difficult problem of characterization. In the ini-
tial encounter with this problem in Hutchison v. Mitchel 72 the Supreme
Court of Texas found an implication of periodic gift of the income from
the trust as well as the eventual right to the corpus of a trust created by a
husband for the benefit of his wife.73 In a later nineteenth century trust
case74 and in one instance in which the grantor of a legal life estate ex-
pressed a clear intention that subsequent income should be the grantee's
separate property, 75 courts of appeal followed a gift-analysis in character-
izing the income. Somewhat later the subject became involved in the
68. Wade, 923 S.W.2d at 739.
69. 647 S.W.2d 945, 946-47 (Tex. 1983).
70. Wade, 923 S.W.2d at 740.
71. See McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 188-89 (Tex. App.-Houston f[st Dist.]
1995, writ denied).
72. 39 Tex. 488 (1873). The inclination of unreconstructed Texas judges, both state
and federal, to question the soundness of decisions of the Texas Supreme Court during the
last phrase of reconstruction has been motivated by an almost total lack of reason and an
embarrassing abundance of bombast that for the reputation of all those judges should be
henceforth forgotten. See James W. Paulsen & James Hambleton, Confederates and Car-
petbaggers: The Precedential Value of Decision from the Civil War and Reconstruction
Eras, 51 TEX. BAR J. 916 (1988). However one may feel about the highly political circum-
stances and conclusion of the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Ex parte Rodriguez,
39 Tex. 706 (1873), concerning which the evidence is exceptionally murky, no question has
ever been raised or any evidence adduced to impugn the motives of the court in deciding
Hutchison v. Mitchell.
73. Hutchison, 39 Tex. at 493-94.
74. McClelland v. McClelland, 37 S.W. 350 (Tex. Civ. App.- Austin 1896, writ ref'd).
75. Sullivan v. Skinner, 66 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1902, writ refd).
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highly political issue of taxation of trust income76 which was ultimately
resolved by the Revenue Act of 1948, 77 allowing the spousal joint in-
come-tax return and the consequential splitting of trust-income between
spouses. Prior to that enactment, however, Texas federal judges and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 1930s and '40s had characterized
trust income as community property to achieve that result. To reach that
conclusion those courts dismissed the authority of Hutchison v. Mitchell,
ignored later Texas appellate cases, and analyzed trust doctrine in a way
that may be most politely termed excessively steeped in terminology:
The beneficiary of a trust is the owner of an equitable interest in the trust
that is called an equitable estate. That equitable interest, because it is
called an estate, is separate property. Hence, the income from that equi-
table estate is community property. This argument may sound convincing
enough until one examines the meaning of the terms used. Saying that
the beneficiary of a trust owns an equitable estate in the trust corpus
means nothing more nor less than that the beneficiary has a right (long
ago recognized in English courts of equity) to enforce the trust. That is
all that the term means. In its function, however, the Anglo-American
trust is a device which the law allows for making an effective continuing
gift of income from property held in trust. Frequently, but not always,
the settlor of a trust may make an eventual gift of the corpus of the trust
to the beneficiary, though the settlor may choose to make someone else
the donee of the corpus or even have it return to himself. Although
Texas courts have not put their analysis in these precise terms, this result
is nonetheless embodied in their conclusions. 78 After reviewing the Texas
and federal cases in 1982 in Wilmington Trust Co. v. United States79 the
federal Claims Court concluded that the weight of Texas authority sup-
ports the characterization of trust income as separate property and that
the Fifth Circuit's tax-motivated analysis was fundamentally unsound,
though followed by some intermediate Texas appellate courts. The result
reached by the Claims Court has also been reached by the Tyler Court of
Appeals in Cleaver v. George Stanton Co.80 and its companion case
Cleaver v. Cleaver.8'
TWo Courts of Appeals (in 189382 and again in 189583) reached the con-
clusion that income from a self-settled trust is separate property, though
76. See Commissioner v. Estate of Hinds, 180 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1950); McFaddin v.
Commissioner, 148 F.2d 570 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Sims, 148 F.2d 574 (5th Cir.
1945), Commissioner v. Porter, 148 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v. Wilson, 76
F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1935).
77. Act of April 2, 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110.
78. See Regis W. Campfield, Interspousal Transfers, 32 Sw. L.J. 1091, 1134-62 (1979);
Joseph W. McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44,
47 (1969).
79. 4 Cl. Ct. 6 (1982), affd, 753 F.2d 1055 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
80. 908 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. App.-yler 1996, writ denied).
81. 935 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. App.-yler 1996, n.w.h.)
82. Shepfin v. Small, 23 S.W. 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1893, no writ).
83. Monday v. Vance, 32 S.W.559 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1895, no writ.)
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it was concluded in 1955 that such income is community property. 84 In-
come from a self-settled trust, however, cannot rest on a gift analysis be-
cause a person cannot make a gift to himself. If the conclusion in favor of
separate property is to be reached, it may depend on the time when the
trust was created (that is, when the settlor was single) or the fact that the
separate corpus is transformed into a retained income interest.8 5 In rely-
ing on such an analysis one would feel a great deal more comfortable if
the trust were also made irrevocable at its creation. Then, it may be said
that the nature of the interest held in trust was permanently fixed prior to
marriage. Thus, prior to marriage the settlor might limit his interest in
property (then separate) to a lesser, or different, separate interest.
Characterization of the income from a self-settled trust was before the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Lemke v. Lemke.86 While single, the
future husband had created a spendthrift trust for his own benefit. The
initial corpus of the trust was the proceeds of a judgment for medical
malpractice for brain damage suffered by the settlor. It is not stated
whether the trust was irrevocable, but the trust may have been irrevoca-
ble or the court may have inferred irrevocability from the terms of its
spendthrift provisions of the trust. In her absolute discretion the trustee
was to pay to the beneficiary-settlor the income of the trust and as much
of corpus of the trust as his needs demanded. The beneficiary subse-
quently married. Upon the beneficiary's divorce, questions were raised
as to characterization of trust income that might have been retained dur-
ing marriage and added to the trust corpus. 87 The court put the burden of
proving any community property in the corpus of the trust on the wife.
As to the original corpus of the trust the burden seems properly put on
the wife because the premarital injury-recovery, which was placed in
trust, was not acquired during marriage, even if made in part for loss of
future earning capacity. There was no evidence of specific sources of dis-
tributions from the trust, but during the marriage the trust had distributed
more than the total value of its earnings of all kinds during that period.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals therefore concluded that the wife had
failed to show that there was any community property retained by the
trustee. The wife's burden in this regard, nevertheless, seems misplaced.
As the party who asserted that the property held by the trustee during
marriage was not community property, the husband surely had the bur-
den to demonstrate that point despite the net deficit in the receipt of
income during the marriage. The court's further observation that under
the Property Code88 the wife lacked standing to question the validity of
84. Merchantile National Bank v. Wilson, 279 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App-Dallas
1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. As in Shipfin and Monday. In both of those instances the trust was created with
the wife's separate property during marriage.
86. 929 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
87. As against the creditors of a settlor of a trust for the settlor's benefit, a spendthrift
provision as to trust income is ordinarily ineffective, but that issue was not before the
court.
88. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 115.011 (a) (Vernon 1995).
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that trust or to join it in this suit 89 scarcely constitutes a sufficient re-
sponse to her reliance on the constitutional definition of community
property. The court's conclusion in this regard, therefore, seems
erroneous.
D. RETIREMENT BENEFITS
Retirement and pension benefits are regarded as a form of deferred
compensation by definition and, hence, if earned during marriage, are
characterized as community property.90 The courts calculate the propor-
tional amounts of pension trust holdings constituting separate and com-
munity property using a formula of prorata allocation of income and its
appreciation in value in the corpus of a pension trust. The courts allocate
the income and appreciation based on the time during which income has
been accumulated over the life of the trust, that is, prior to marriage,
during marriage, and following the divorce of the pensioner.91 In
Bloomer v. Bloomer,92 however, the court concluded that although the
separate and community property elements of military pensions are ordi-
narily calculated on a time-basis for active-duty military personnel, it is
appropriate, in the case of reserve personnel, to use the point-system em-
ployed by the military service itself in computing separate and commu-
nity interests. 93 In either case, however, the value of the community
interest is limited by its amount at the date of divorce.94
In a post-divorce case 95 in which the wife of an active-duty soldier had
been awarded one-half of the community portion of her husband's mili-
tary retirement pay when and if received, the ex-husband later chose to
withdraw from military service and to receive a special separation-benefit
as provided by Congressional entitlement. The court held that the ex-
wife was entitled to a portion of that payment which the ex-husband had
received as a substitute for his unmatured retirement benefits. 96
In Jones v. Jones97 the Corpus Christi court dealt with a somewhat
analogous situation. On divorce an agreed judgment provided that when
the soldier-husband retired the wife would receive from him each month
an amount equal to 25 percent of what someone of his rank would receive
at that time. On retirement the ex-husband was rated as 40 percent dis-
abled and his retirement pay was therefore reduced. The ex-wife brought
suit to enforce the judgment, and her ex-husband asserted that his full
89. Lemke, 929 S.W.2d at 664-65.
90. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970).
91. Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. 1977).
92. 927 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied).
93. Id. at 120-121.
94. Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 947.
95. Marsh v. Wallace, 924 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
96. Id. at 426-27. Under a private pension plan, however, a disability payment may be
nothing more than deferred earnings and will be characterized as community property if
the interest under the plan accrued during marriage. See McElwee, 911 S.W.2d at 188.
97. 900 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, writ denied).
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pay was not subject to division under federal law, 98 because disability
benefits accepted in lieu of retirement benefits are not subject to division
on divorce. The court held that the ex-husband's defense constituted a
collateral attack on the unappealed judgment and was barred by the doc-
trine of res judicata.99
In Pelzig v. Berkebile'00 the court commented on the different modes
of characterization of funds in defined-benefit plans' 0' and the particular
defined-contribution plan before the court in that case. In the former, a
very common type of plan to which the employee does not contribute, the
benefit is based on the length of time the employee has been a member of
the plan at the time of retirement. For computing the community share in
a defined-benefit plan, the ratio of the number of months during mar-
riage to the total number of months within the plan provides the commu-
nity fractional share to be applied to the value of the interest at
divorce. 10 2 For evaluating the community share in a defined-contribution
plan the amount of money contributed by the employee rather than
length of the employee's membership during marriage is controlling.
Computation and classification are made easier by the fact that all contri-
butions are by the employee, simply as deferred wages. To compute the
community share in that case, the amount of contributions prior to mar-
riage are subtracted from the amount contributed during marriage. 0 3
E. TERMINABLE INTEREST RULE FOR STATE EMPLOYEES'
PENSION PLANS
Among those nearest the crown, the Castilian monarchy fostered a
self-serving disregard for the rules of marital sharing. To induce and re-
ward special loyalty, the king had secured a rule, agreed to by those most
likely to enjoy its benefits, that takers from the crown enjoyed their ac-
quisitions as separate property rather than sharing it with their
spouses. 104 Although the Spanish commentators on the rule sought to
confine its application to true gifts and thus to bring such acquisitions by a
spouse within the ordinary rules of separate and community property
law,105 the king's highest judges nevertheless tended to construe any
98. 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
99. Jones, 900 S.W.2d at 787-88.
100. 931 S.W.2d 398, 403 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no writ).
101. See, e.g., Berry, 647 S.W.2d at 945.
102. See Hatteberg v. Hatteberg, 933 S.W.2d 522, 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, no writ); Steven R. Brown, Comment, An Interdisciptionary Analysis of the Division
of Pension Benefits in Divorce and Post Judgment Partition Actions: Cures for the Inequities
in Berry v. Berry, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 107, 115 (1985).
103. See Inglinsky v. Inglinsky, 735 S.W.2d 536, 538 [Tex. App.-Tyler 1987, no writ);
see also Hatteberg, 933 S.W.2d at 531; Brown, supra note 102, at 112-13.
104. FUERO REAL 111.3.1-2 (1255); RECOP. V.9.2-3 (1567) Nov. REC. X.4.1-2 (1805).
105. See JUAN LOPEZ DE PALACIOS RuBIos, IN LIBRUM QUARTUM DECRETALIUM
GREGORI! 20.65 (1573); JUAN DE MAT1ENcO, COMMENTARIA IN LIBRUM QUINTUM
RECOLLECTIONES LEGUM HISPANIAE (1580); contrast comments on RECOP. V.9.3, gl. 6, no.




royal grant made to a courtier or other employee of the crown as a gift,
and thus, to disregard the principle that a spouse's acquisition for the
performance of services were community property.10 6 Despite the demo-
cratic spirit that prevailed on the American frontier during the nineteenth
century and most of the twentieth century, the impact of the Spanish rule
was nonetheless considerable in relation to acquisitions of land from the
sovereign, 0 7 though as a result of blind adherence to doctrine without
any effort on the part of the courts to examine the principle's monarchial
underpinning. In recent decades, as republican ideology in American
government has declined, the self-serving interest of lawmakers on behalf
of governmental employees has tended to be condoned by the imperial
judiciary that may equate its own interests with those of other members
of the governmental hierarchy.
In 1925 the Supreme Court of Texas made it plain in Arnold v. Leon-
ard'0 8 that the Texas Constitution'0 9 does not allow the legislature to ex-
pand the constitutional definition of separate property, there confined to
gifts, inheritances, and that which spouses bring into a marriage. By a
broad reading of the concept of premarital holdings in 1972" ° the court,
nevertheless, defined compensation for bodily loss as separate property
but made it clear that compensation for loss of a spouse's earning power
is shared by both spouses. In two subsequent instances, however, a di-
vided Dallas Court of Civil Appeals"' followed by a panel of the First
District Court of Appeals" 2 approved Texas's legislative provisions that
terminated the community property rights of the spouse of a state em-
ployee in the employee's state pension when the spouse predeceases the
state employee. The Texas legislature, however, has not so far departed
from constitutional principles to attempt to deprive a divorcing spouse of
a state employee of such rights.
In 1994 the Texas legislature consolidated the rule for the various state
pension plans into a general rule for the pension plans of all state employ-
ees whereby the predeceasing spouse loses all rights in the community
estate. 113 The constitutionality of this rule came before a federal court in
Houston in 1995 in Kunin v. Feofanov." 4 The claimant to an interest in
106. See MATIENCO, op. cit. on RECOP. V.9.3, gl 6, no. 8 concerning the dispute between
Dr. Ant6nio Diaz Montalvo, the draftsman of the ORDINANCES OF CASTILE, and his wife's
heirs.
107. See, e.g., Gayoso de Lemos v. Garcia, 1 Mart. N.S. 324 (La. 1823); Nod v. Card, 14
Calif. 576 (1860); Fisk v. Flores, 43 Tex. 340 (1875).
108. 114 Tex. 535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925).
109. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, §15.
110. Graham v. Franco, 488 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1972).
111. Lack v. Lack, 584 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
strong dissent of Robertson, J. at 900-02 has nevertheless, received support from commen-
tators. See JOSEPH W. MCKNIOHT & WILLIAM A. REPPY, JR., TEXAS MATRIMONIAL PROP-
ERTY LAW 119 (1983).
112. Duckett v. Board of Trustees, 832 S.W.2d 438, 441-42 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
113. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 804.101 (Vernon 1994).
114. No. H-93-3824 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 1995) reported as an appendix to Kunin v. Fe-
ofanov, 69 F.3d 59, 60 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the state employee's pension plan was the son of the prospective pen-
sioner's wife who had died intestate as to that interest in June, 1993. Her
son was therefore the intestate taker of any community interest his
mother had in the plan.115 The Supreme Court of Texas in Allard v.
Frech" 6 had held as recently as 1989 that a terminable interest provision,
that is, one that cuts off the community interest of a predeceasing spouse
of an employee, in a private pension plan was unconstitutional under
Texas law. The federal court, however, took a different view of state law
for public pensioners. Relying on the statutory terminable interest rule
governing state-employees' pension plans, the holdings of the intermedi-
ate appellate courts applying that rule, and the fact that Allard dealt only
with a private pension plan rather than a public one, the federal district
court sustained the validity of the legislative terminal interest rule apply-
ing to state employees, and that conclusion was affirmed in a per curiam
opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 117 The court particularly
relied on the argument that the Texas statute does not alter the constitu-
tional definition of separate and community property but merely "defines
the non-member spouse's statutory property interest itself as one that ter-
minates upon the death of such non-member spouse." 118 The answer to
such sophistry is that in so doing the legislature thereby deprives the
spouse of a state employee of a community property interest in which all
other Texas spouses are constitutionally protected under Allard. In a fur-
ther effort to distinguish Allard, the court also pointed out that the Texas
Supreme Court had there said that "such matter is better left to the legis-
lature." 1 9 But a concurring judge in Allard had also suggested that such
a legislative act might be unconstitutional. 120
F. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW RELATING TO
PENSION PLANS
Although the provisions of the federal Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)121 were inapplicable to the dispute in
Kunin, because ERISA by its terms is inapplicable to any pension plan
maintained by a state government or the federal government, as well as
by charitable organizations, 22 the applicability of ERISA to other pen-
sion plans was at issue in Boggs v. Boggs, a decision of a Louisiana fed-
eral district court 123 that was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of
115. Ironically, if she had lived until September 1, 1993 and had made no testamentary
disposition of her interest, it would have passed to her husband. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 45 (Vernon Supp. 1997) (effective September 1, 1993).
116. 754 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006 (1989).
117. Kunin, 69 F.3d at 60.
118. Id. at 64 (citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 804.101 (Vernon 1994)).
119. Allard, 754 S.W.2d at 115.
120. Id. at 115-16 (Ray, J., concurring).
121. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1995).
122. Id. § 1003(b).
123. 849 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. La. 1994).
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Appeals. 124 In Boggs, a husband-pensioner of a private pension plan had
been predeceased in 1979 by his first wife. She had provided in her will
that her husband should receive a usufruct in two-thirds of her estate,
which included a one-half interest in the husband's pension plan acquired
during their marriage with the other one-third passing to their children.
After her death the husband-pensioner remarried in 1980 and was sur-
vived by his second wife when he died in 1994. Against the children of
the first wife, the widow sought a declaratory judgment that the provi-
sions of ERISA 125 have the effect of preempting state community prop-
erty law, and the widow is therefore the sole beneficiary of her husband's
pension plan under ERISA, which gives a surviving spouse the pen-
sioner's rights under the plan. 126 To preclude federal preemption in
Boggs, the majority of a Fifth Circuit panel relied in large measure on the
holding of the United States Supreme Court that ERISA had not pre-
empted the operation of a Georgia law precluding garnishment of funds
exempt under ERISA. 127 The court argued that Louisiana's community
property system [merely] affects
what a plan participant does with his benefits after they are re-
ceived1 28 .... [T]he Louisiana community property law is not suffi-
ciently 'related to' an employee benefit plan to necessitate ERISA
preemption. Nothing is sought from the plan or its fiduciary. No
duty will be imposed on the plan or the administrator. Benefits will
continue to be paid to the beneficiary in the manner provided in the
plan. A spouse's accounting obligation under community property
law affects employee benefits plans "in too tenuous, remote or pe-
ripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'related to' the
plan."129
ERISA was presumably "not meant to consume everything in its path,"
as the Fifth Circuit Court had said on an earlier occasion, 30 and the ma-
jority of the Fifth Circuit panel might have further supported its argument
by stressing that a non-pensioner-spouse's right in community property
arises on acquisition not by assignment of the pensioner.' 31 Circuit Judge
King, who also participated in the Kunin decision, dissented. She relied
124. 82 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S.Ct. 379, (U.S. Nov. 1, 1996) (No. 96-
79).
125. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1995) (the provisions of ERISA "shall supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan de-
scribed in section 1003(a) and not exempt under section 1003(b).").
126. 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (1995).
127. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825 (1988). That case was also re-
lied on by the unanimous Supreme Court in rejecting another, but somewhat different,
agreement in form of ERISA preemption in New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1680 (1995).
128. Boggs, 82 F.3d at 96.
129. Id. at 96-97 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983)).
130. Hook v. Morrison Milling Co., 38 F.3d 776, 786 (5th Cir. 1994).
131. The Fifth Circuit court voted against an en banc reconsideration of the case with
six judges dissenting. Boggs v. Boggs, 89 F.3d 1169 (5th Cir. 1996). The dissenting opinion
with respect to refusal to grant the en banc reconsideration nicely responded to that point.
89 F.3d at 1180-83.
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heavily on the view expressed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Ablamis v. Roper132 and on an Advisory Opinion of the Department of
Labor 133 that ERISA is meant to favor the plan participant and no
other.134
III. CONTROL AND LIABILITY OF MARITAL PROPERTY
A. SPOUSAL AGREEMENT FOR THE SURVIVOR'S RIGHT TO
COMMUNITY PROPERTY
After article XVI, section 15 of the Texas Constitution 135 was amended
in 1987 to allow spouses to provide reciprocal rights of survivorship to
community property, the Legislature enacted statutes in 1989 to govern
that process. Section 455 of the Probate Code 136 provides four means for
revoking such agreements: (1) in a manner provided in the agreement,
(2) in the absence of such a term in the agreement by a written agreement
made between the spouses (3) by one spouse's written notice to the other,
or (4) by disposition of the property by one or both spouses in accordance
with applicable law and not inconsistent with the terms of the agreement.
In Haas v. Voigt 13 7 the husband and wife had entered into agreements for
survivorship of their community property deposited in four bank ac-
counts. After the wife became incompetent, the husband and one of his
sons purported to create joint tenancies with a right of survivorship be-
tween them with respect to the funds in all the accounts. The husband
died soon afterward. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
acts of the husband and son were ineffective to change the spouses' survi-
vorship agreements. Though they were left in the accounts where they
were originally deposited, it was presumably argued that changing the
ultimate disposition of the funds constituted a "disposition," but the later
change was certainly contrary to the spousal agreement. Further,
whatever rules of law may have controlled the management of the funds
prior to the spousal survivorship agreements, the spousal agreement itself
indicated that the funds on deposit were subject to joint management of
the spouses until they otherwise agreed. If the spouses had had an agree-
ment with the depository allowing either spouse to withdraw funds, it
might have been successfully argued that the husband's unilateral acts in
company with his son to redesignate the status of the accounts would
have constituted a mutually anticipated disposition of them. If there had
been such an agreement with the depository, the husband's actual with-
drawal of the funds and redeposit of them elsewhere would have consti-
tuted a clearer case of authorized unilateral disposition.
132. 937 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1991).
133. DOL Advisory Opinion No. 90-46A (Dec. 4, 1990).
134. Boggs, 82 F.3d at 98 (King, C.J., dissenting).
135. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, §15.
136. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 455 (Vernon Supp. 1997).
137. 940 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ requested).
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B. DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN A RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT AND
RECOVERY FOR ToRTIous INJURY
Disputes concerning control of marital property usually arise inter se,
whereas disputes concerning liability are usually inter alia, that is, be-
tween a spouse, or both spouses collectively, against an outsider. In
Schlueter v. Schlueter138 the Austin Court of Appeals explored some of
the difficulties inherent in joining an interspousal action concerning con-
trol of property involving a third person with a suit for divorce. In this
instance the cause of action was for actual fraud, which although rarely
pursued, could have been brought prior to removal of the bar of spousal
immunity, although the extent of the remedies then available was uncer-
tain. 139 Committing a constructive fraud on the community estate does
not constitute a tortious wrong against the other spouse but rather gives
rise to a right of reimbursement. 140 It has been sometimes said, however,
that a spousal disposition of property with intent to deprive the other
spouse of a community interest will support an independent cause of ac-
tion for fraud.' 4 ' In Schlueter the husband delivered a check for the hus-
band's earnings to his father, who deposited it to his own account. The
father later withdrew over $12,500 from the bank account shortly before
the husband filed suit for divorce against his wife. The father presumably
secreted the money elsewhere. In her countersuit for divorce, the wife
joined an independent action against her husband and his father for fraud
and conspiracy. At the trial, the husband at first explained that the
amount transferred to his father represented money borrowed by the
husband over the past thirty years, hence a mere constructive fraud, 42
but he later changed his testimony and the jury found both defendants
liable for fraud. The jury awarded compensatory damages against the
husband and his father jointly and severally and punitive damages against
the husband for $30,000 and against his father for $15,000.143 Compensa-
tory damages were awarded for depletion of the community estate which
would then be divided between the spouses. The consequential damages
incurred by the wife in retrieving community assets should also have been
awarded to the community estate for the community expense incurred in
138. 929 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ granted).
139. See Stramler v. Coe, 15 Tex. 211, 215 (1855); Mahoney v. Snyder, 93 S.W.2d 1219
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1936, no writ); Bettis v. Bettis, 83 S.W.2d 1076 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1935, no writ).
140. See In re Moore, 890 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ), commented
on in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
49 SMU L. REV. 1015, 1028-29 (1996). It is unclear whether Mazique v. Mazique, 742
S.W.2d 805, 808 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), was a case of constructive
or actual fraud. In her pleading the wife evidently sought reimbursement on behalf of her
husband's expenditure of community funds for the benefit of his separate estate but the
nature of that claim was not explained in the opinion. Id. at 806.
141. See Bridges v. Bridges, 404 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966, no writ)
(fraudulent use of community funds subsequent to divorce).
142. Schlueter, 929 S.W.2d at 96.
143. Id. at 95-96. The father's appeal was limited to an evidentiary point, which the
appellate court decided against him, and there was no further discussion of his liability.
1997] 1207
SMU LAW REVIEW
their recovery. The Austin court apparently reached the conclusion that
a spouse's recovery of exemplary damages is the separate property of the
spouse-recipient as a reward for personal persistence,' 44 but in reaching
that conclusion the value of community time expended for that purpose
should be excluded for community reimbursement.
An award of damages in favor of the community against a spouse and a
third party for actual fraud in an action joined with a suit for a divorce
presents a problem in performing a prompt division of the community
estate. An easy means of achieving timely division is to treat the guilty
spouse's obligation to the community as discharged by including his debt
to the community as part of his community share in its division. In the
case of a fully depleted community estate, however, the innocent spouse
will be left to choose the order of enforcing her money judgments against
the joint-tortfeasors.
A fact pattern that lends itself more readily to classification as actual
fraud prompted the dispute in Vickery and Richard v. Vickery. 145 The
fraud practiced by the husband was more elaborate than that which had
provoked the litigation in Oliver v. Oliver, 46 as might be expected when
a husband-lawyer employs his wits to defraud. Apparently anxious to be
divorced in order to remarry, the husband used a former client's malprac-
tice action for an amount far beyond his insurance limits to convince his
wife that she should sue him for divorce in order to provide a means of
removing assets from the risk of seizure. 47 As he seemingly related the
scheme to his wife, she would be awarded assets more than sufficient for
her needs until the threat of the lawsuit had passed and they then would
be reunited. The wife resisted the scheme for some time but finally suc-
cumbed. The husband hired another lawyer to bring a suit on behalf of
his wife, but the attorney did not consult with the wife and without the
wife's knowledge also prepared a counter claim for the husband. Also
without the wife's knowledge the husband's ex-client agreed to settle her
claim within the coverage of the husband's malpractice insurance policy.
But the wife was induced to sign the proposed divorce decree dividing
some but not all of the marital property and after a hearing, at which only
the husband and the wife's lawyers were present, the judge signed the
decree.
The ex-husband remarried soon after the divorce. About six months
later the ex-husband hired an attorney to achieve the ex-wife's move
from separate property awarded to the ex-husband, and the ex-wife also
hired counsel. After not very long, the ex-wife brought a bill of review to
set aside the property division made by the decree and sought a redivi-
144. Id.
145. No. 01-94-01004-CV, 1996 WL 745881 (Tex. App.-Houston fist Dist.], Dec. 30,
1996, n.w.h.) (not designated for publication).
146. 889 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. 1994), commented on in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law &
Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1230-31 (1995).
147. The scheme is thus reminiscent of that which was unsuccessfully pursued in Steed
v. Bost, 602 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, no writ).
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sion of the property already divided and an action against her ex-husband
for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and an action for a division of secreted community assets. The
ex-wife also joined an action against her divorce-lawyer for breach of fi-
duciary duty with respect to the undivided property. The court found
that without negligence on the wife's part extrinsic fraud had been com-
mitted with respect to the community property so that the bill of review
should be granted. The court also awarded the ex-wife damages against
her attorney for mental anguish and against her ex-husband for more sub-
stantial damages for property loss and mental anguish and for exemplary
damages of $1,000,000. The court also made a division of the undivided
property and a redivision of property, which included a mischaracteriza-
tion of the ex-husband's separate property and its division in his favor as
part of the community estate. A unanimous panel of the First District
Court of Appeals sustained all the conclusions except as to the characteri-
zation of property, and, thus, a remand was required for a further redivi-
sion. An attempt to achieve an en banc hearing failed and two judges
dissented from that conclusion. The dissenters asserted that the only is-
sue of fraud submitted to the jury was for what they termed "constructive
fraud" in hiding assets and not the issue of actual fraud of inducing the
wife to consent to a sham divorce and an agreed division of property.
The dissenters were equally critical of the decision in Schlueter, which
they saw as a case involving no more than constructive fraud in hiding
assets. Because of a lack of actual fraud as they construed the findings in
Vickery, the dissenters further concluded that there could be no award of
damages for mental anguish against either defendant and no award
against the ex-husband for punitive damages.148
Even though one spouse (behaving as the husband did in Schlueter)
may be motivated to harm the other with respect to a community prop-
erty interest in connection with a pending divorce, the dissenting judges
in Vickery did not characterize such conduct as actual fraud in the sense
of grounding an independent cause of action between spouses. Rather,
such behavior would be said to constitute constructive fraud.
It used to be said that the test of actionability of fraud of one spouse
against another in the gratuitous disposition of community property was
whether the act was committed with an actual intent to harm.149 As sug-
148. The information contained in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the dissent
from the refusal for an en banc hearing is insufficient to serve as a basis for comment on
the pleadings and the jury submissions. It appears, however, that there were sufficient
grounds for relief by bill of review and for damages based on the independent cause of
action for fraudulently inducing a divorce and an agreed settlement. But if the dissenters
were correct in their premises, it is difficult to understand how damages for constructive
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty not shown to be motivated by malice could support an
award mental anguish and how such a recovery, standing alone, could support an award for
exemplary damages.
149. See Dunn v. Vinyard, 234 S.W. 99, 103 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ
related to this part of the case). The flagrance of the spouse's fraudulent conduct in secret-
ing assets might also be a test of actionability but the application of such a standard would
almost invariably produce uneven results.
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gested by the dissenting judges in Vickery, the actionability of a spouse's
fraudulent or other tort-like act complained of at divorce must turn on
whether the improper act of the other spouse constituted an independent
or extrinsic wrong (as the fraudulently secreted divorce in Oliver150 or the
fraudulent induced divorce in Vickeryl51 ) rather than the mere hiding of
assets. It might be added that the Legislature has already given divorce
courts an adequate but different sort of power to deal with the problem of
secreted assets in Family Code section 3.58152 without the need for any
additional cause of action.15 3
Even when the issue of the extent of permitted interspousal actions is
resolved, there is the further problem of dealing with the actionability of
collusive acts of third persons. In recent years there has been an inclina-
tion on the part of some courts to make third persons liable merely be-
cause of involvement with a spouse in an effort to secrete assets, as in
Schlueter and Edgington v. Maddison.l54 A test of actionability against
third persons (consistent with that concerning actionability of acts of a
spouse) would be to limit liability of the third person to those instances in
which a spouse would also be subject to an independent action. In Edg-
ington it was also suggested that if the spouse's act was contemptible, the
deliberate act of the third person in assisting that act should be actiona-
ble. It would be better to say that the third party's act is merely con-
temptible in that case. It has also been said that a spouse's depletion of
community assets through a constructive fraud merely provides a right of
reimbursement 155 against the other spouse only and thus no recourse
against the third person except when restitution from the spouse is of no
avail.156
In relation to a claim for constructive fraud the Fourteenth District ap-
pellate court in Zieba v. Martin157 discussed a number of points on stan-
dards of proof, presumptions, and burdens to establish a claim for
reimbursement, though because the court was dealing with a divorce situ-
150. Oliver v. Oliver, 889 S.W.2d 271, 272, 274 (Tex. 1994).
151. Vickery, 1996 WL 745881.
152. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(a)(6), (a)(10), (c)(1) (Vernon 1993).
153. For a generally negative assessment of the need to recognize intentional spousal
emotional distress as a cause of action, see Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman,
Spousal Emotional Abuse as a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268 (1996).
154. 870 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
155. See Putnam, M.D.P.A. Money Purchase Pension Plan v. Stephenson, 805 S.W.2d
16 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd w.o.j.); Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
156. See Carnes, 533 S.W.2d at 371-72. As recently as 1970 the Dallas Court of Civil
Appeals absolved a third party of liability for fraudulent connivance in such a context
despite a jury's finding of virtual participation of the third party in the fraudulent scheme.
Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). But in light of subsequent development, such a conclusion must be termed outmo-
ded. See Edgington v. Maddison, 870 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994,
no writ); Jones v. Jones, 804 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ); Spruill v.
Spruill, 624 S.W.2d 694 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 1981, writ dism'd).
157. 928 S.W.2d 782, 787-790 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
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ation, the court blurred the lines between a finding of a right of reim-
bursement and making a division of assets.'- 8 Both processes involve an
independent exercise of discretion: (1) in determining of the right of re-
imbursement and (2) in making the division of community property. The
second exercise of discretion, however, occurs only in cases of divorce or
annulment and not in dividing property on the death of a spouse. In
Zeiba the court went astray in failing to distinguish between a spouse's
duty to discharge an obligation and the inappropriate use of funds to dis-
charge the duty. The court held that no right of reimbursement arises
from the use of community funds to discharge obligations judicially fixed
in relation to a spouse's prior marriage.
There is no question that the creditor for whose benefit a judgment was
granted against a Texas spouse prior to marriage may seek satisfaction
from separate funds of the debtor-spouse or from community funds sub-
ject to that spouse's sole or joint control. 159 But if community funds are
used to discharge such an obligation judicially fixed prior to marriage, the
other spouse is as much deprived of his or her share of those assets as
would have been the case of the debtor-spouse's voluntarily expending
community rather than separate assets for any other separate purpose.
The commentators on old Spanish law are instructive on this point. As
a matter of policy Juan Matienqo 160 would have imposed a duty on com-
mon property to pay an obligation for support of a needy parent (and, a
fortiori, a minor child) because it was a duty of support and because there
might not be any separate property available to discharge the duty.' 6 '
Matiengo, however, did not discuss the right of reimbursement of the
community estate when the time came to divide community property on
termination of a marriage. Juan Guti~rrez,162 on the other hand, assumed
that a parent's duty of support would have been discharged with commu-
nity funds and went on to say that the spouse whose duty is was to pro-
vide support should reimburse the community estate for the support
provided. 163 To those commentators the point was so obvious as not to
need further elaboration.
In many instances, of course, the debtor-spouse may not have any sepa-
rate assets to pay for the support of children of a prior marriage. Further,
the constructively defrauded spouse may have been fully aware of the
pressing need to discharge premarital obligations when the marriage took
158. Id. at 787.
159. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61(a), (b) (Vernon 1993).
160. Matienqo served on the high courts of Lima, Charcas, and Sima in mid-sixteenth
Peru century before attaining the rank of senator of the Argentinian Chancery.
161. JUAN DE MATIENCO, COMMENTARIA IN LIBRUM QUINTUM RECOLLECrIONIS
LEGUM HISPANIAE on RECOP. V.9.3, gl. 7, no. 10 (1580). But, by contrast, Matienqo saw
no policy-based reason to impose a duty on the community estate to pay for a tortious
injury caused by only one of the spouses. Id. at gl. 7, no. 11.
162. c.1530 - 1618.
163. JUAN GUTII RREZ, PRACrICARUM QUESTIONUM CIRCA LEGES REGIAS HISPANIAE
Q 129.1 (1606) where he noted that the same view had been expressed by DIEGO SALON
DE PAZ, QUESTIONES CIVILES Q 8.18 (1576).
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place. In such instances, these factors can be considered by the court in
exercising its discretion (1) in fixing a right of reimbursement and (2) in
dividing that and other community property on divorce rather than treat-
ing the judicial nature of the obligation of the debtor-spouse as determi-
native of the duty of reimbursement. On divorce and annulment
reimbursement cases always present a two-step process, whereas in cases
of disposition of property of a void marriage or on dissolution of a valid
marriage by death, the second step involving equitable division of the
community estate is not at issue. In the case of a claim for reimburse-
ment against a deceased spouse's estate, the use of community funds to
discharge a premarital contractual judgment-debt without any showing of
countervailing community benefit gives rise to a right of community reim-
bursement. The use of community funds for payment of a judicially or-
dered monetary amount, whether for damages or for a support
obligation, should not produce a different result.
In Zieba the court also made reference to consent of a non-transferor
spouse in relation to a right of reimbursement. In most instances failure
of the other spouse to express any opinion as to a disposition of commu-
nity property by the sole manager is determinative of nothing. Nor is an
expression of disapproval required in determining the application of re-
imbursement principles. The significance of an expression of approval, or
seeming approval, may, however, have some bearing on a court's exercise
of its discretion in determining whether there is a right of reimbursement.
The best way to avoid disputes with respect to claims for reimburse-
ment of community assets used to discharge personal obligations or per-
sonal predilections of a spouse is to provide in a written partition that
future income that either spouse uses for such purposes will be that
spouse's separate property. An increasing number of premarital and
marital partitions so provide. A counselor who represents a person about
to enter into marriage with prior separate obligations to meet, or about to
marry someone with such obligations, should advise his client of the use-
fulness of these devices to avoid future misunderstandings and disputes.
In Pelzigl64 the court also considered expenditures of community funds
by a husband for the benefit of a former wife and a child of the former
marriage, all pursuant to court orders and apparently with the knowledge
of the wife. In discussing these matters, the court made the curious re-
mark that there was "no evidence that these expenses benefited [the hus-
band's] separate estate"'165 and hence the trial court was justified in
exercising her application of equity in not finding a right of reimburse-
ment in that instance. The appellate court put emphasis on the lack of
deception of the wife and her failure to object to the husband's payment
of the prior wife's divorce-attorney's fees though he was not judicially
164. 931 S.W.2d at 400-01.
165. Id. at 400. If an obligation is fixed prior to marriage, it is characterized as a sepa-
rate debt though the creditor may reach solely or jointly managed community property to
achieve satisfaction of it. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.61 (Vernon 1993).
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ordered to do so. The court also stressed the lack of evidence that the
husband's "separate estate" was benefitted 166 in approving the trial
court's denial of reimbursement in that instance. The court's limitation of
the concept of reimbursement to tangible property interests is further in-
dicated by a comment on the husband's expenditures of community funds
to make payments for mortgage-interest, taxes, and insurance for the
benefit of his separate land. 167 The court held that the measure of reim-
bursement in that regard was the amount that the community estate was
benefitted by deductions taken for federal income tax purposes. The
court reached this conclusion without reference to authority allowing re-
imbursement of one marital estate for payments for maintenance, interest
and insurance of another marital estate without any regard for the extent
of the ultimate tax benefits resulting from these payments as tax deduc-
tions. 16s But the notion that rights of reimbursement are generally lim-
ited to expenditure for interest in tangible property is very strange indeed
and in this instance the court said nothing of the relevance of deception
and objection.
Among the divorce cases in which appellate courts have rendered re-
cently reported decisions, three dealt with expenditures for paramours.
In two of these cases the dispositions of assets were treated as construc-
tive frauds. 169 Thomas v. Casale170 was somewhat different. The trial
court had found that the community estate had been improperly depleted
by the husband's disposition of community funds by depositing them in
an account held with his paramour and in using some of the funds for her
benefit, but the trial court's silence on the point suggests that there was
no finding of actual fraud on the husband's part in making the expendi-
ture of funds. On appeal, the paramour contested the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a finding of her knowledge of the community charac-
ter of the funds or the husband's intent to defraud his wife. If such a
finding were supported by the evidence, she would be liable under Family
Code section 3.57171 to repay such funds deposited by the husband to the
mutual account.172 The court held that the evidence was insufficient to
show that the paramour had the requisite knowledge to make her person-
166. Pelzig, 931 S.W.2d at 400.
167. Id. at 401.
168. See, e.g., Brooks v. Brooks, 612 S.W.2d 233, 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981, no
writ); Pruske v. Pruske, 601 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980, writ dism'd);
though some courts have refused to order reimbursement if the profits of the property do
not exceed such expenses. See Cook v. Cook, 665 S.W.2d 161,164 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 612 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1981, no writ); Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147-48, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943).
169. Zieba, 928 S.W.2d at 790; Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d at 848.
170. 924 S.W.2d 433, (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
171. TEX. FAM. CODE ArNN. § 3.57 (Vernon 1993).
172. The court held that the Texas Business and Commerce Code's Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act was irrelevant in this context because it was not shown that the husband-




ally liable to the wife. In Carnes v. Meador,173 which was not a divorce
case and thus one in which section 3.57 was inapplicable, the Dallas Court
of Civil Appeals had held that in cases of constructive fraud a judgment
should not be rendered against the recipient of reimbursable funds unless
the transferor-spouse is unable to make satisfaction. In a case of actual
fraud in which both the transferor and the transferee participated, both
can be liable as joint-tortfeasors.
C. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST A SPOUSE
Dealing with the settlement of a husband's estate following his murder,
which was instigated by his wife, a California court 174 has gone a step
further than awarding punitive damages or fixing a constructive trust on
the property in exacting a spousal penalty. During the marriage the hus-
band had given his wife a joint tenancy interest in his separate realty.175
As a punishment for her wrong, the court deprived the widow of her right
of survivorship to the joint tenancy by analogy to the statutory treatment
of such a joint tenancy interest on divorce. 176 In such a situation, a Texas
widow would also lose such a joint tenancy interest, but in Texas the gift
of the joint tenancy interest from the husband's separate property would
be void under section 46 of the Probate Code.177 If the spouses had cre-
ated an intervivos right of survivorship to community property178 or an
intervivos partition of community property, a Texas court would have to
deal with the same problem as that faced by the California court. In that
instance a Texas court would impose a constructive trust on the right of
survivorship in favor of the husband's heirs with respect to the husband's
community interest but would not interfere with the wicked widow's tak-
ing that which was her own as a tenant in common, thus treating the right
of survivorship as inoperative.
D. SPOUSAL LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS
The principal point at issue in Love v. L K & P, Ltd. 179 was liability of
assignors of unendorsed notes. In absolving the assignors of any liability,
the court stated that the spouses of the assignors would therefore also
avoid liability. 180 That, of course, was not the entire explanation. The
spouses were not liable because they were not parties to the transaction.
173. 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
174. Estate of Castiglioni, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995, rev. denied), dis-
cussed in Charlotte K. Goldberg, Till Death Do Us Part, L.A. DAILY J., Cal. Law Bus. Sec.,
Apr. 15, 1996, at 30-31.
175. CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 251 (1991).
176. Id.
177. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 46 (Vernon 1986). The widow's right in that instance
would not be saved by the contractual exception to the statutory rule. Chandler v.
Kountze, 130 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1939, writ ref d).
178. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 451-462 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1997).
179. 920 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, writ denied).
180. Id. at 479.
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Section 4.031 of the Family Code 181 provides "a spousal non-liability law"
rather than what the court termed a principle of "spousal liability."'1 82
E. NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE HOMESTEAD
1. Abandonment of the Homestead
The Texas Constitution 18 3 provides that temporary renting of a family
home does not cause it to lose its homestead character, but drawing the
line between a homeowner's temporary and permanent removal from a
home is often difficult. In In re Leonard184 the couple had lived in their
urban home since 1979, but in 1993 they moved to a rural community so
that their daughter might attend school there. The wife and her mother
held the rural property by a long term lease. The wife testified that the
family intended to return to the urban home when the daughter reached
a higher level in school and for the time being they rented their urban
home. Although the couple had continued to list their telephone number
at their urban residence from which their calls were forwarded, and they
had continued to vote at their urban precinct, in their 1996 bankruptcy
petition they stated that they resided at their rural address. When they
later claimed the urban home as their homestead, a creditor asserted that
they were barred by judicial estoppel from doing so. The bankruptcy
court concluded, however, that identification of their current residence
for bankruptcy purposes 85 does not preclude their claim of a homestead
under state law. The court held that a homestead had been established in
1979. It was incumbent on the creditor to prove abandonment. 8 6 Rely-
ing on cases in which the debtor's position was weaker than that in the
case before it, 187 the court concluded that the creditor had not met its
burden of proof. The court commented that a homestead can be estab-
lished on leased property, 88 but rarely, if ever, would the occupant of a
leasehold make such an assertion in preference to claiming a freehold of
his homestead.
A bankruptcy court dealt with the problem arising after the marriage
of a man and woman who both have a homestead and one of them subse-
quently moves into the other's home. In In re Brown189 the wife, who
181. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 4.031 (Vernon 1993).
182. Love, 920 S.W.2d at 479.
183. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon 1984 &
Supp. 1997).
184. 194 B.R. 807 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
185. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.003 (Vernon 1984 &
Supp. 1997).
186. Leonard, 194 B.R. at 810.
187. Rancho Oil Co. v. Powell, 142 Tex. 63, 66,175 S.W.2d 960, 963 (1943); McKenzie v.
Mayer, 20 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1929, no writ).
188. Leonard, 194 B.R. at 811 (citing Sullivan v. Barrett, 471 S.W.2d 39, 43 (Tex. 1971),
and the court might have added the more venerable authority of Johnson v. Martin, 81 Tex.
18, 16 S.W. 550 (1891)). See also Capitol Aggregates, Inc. v. Walker, 448 S.W.2d 830 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (maintenance of a homestead by attaching a mo-
bil home to leased premises).
189. 191 B.R. 99 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1995).
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had been married three times by the time she filed for bankruptcy, had
been awarded the family home in her second divorce notwithstanding
that prior to the divorce she had already moved into the house of her
third husband. At the time she moved, however, she was under restraint
of the divorce court to enter the prior home. After her remarriage the
wife filed for bankruptcy and claimed her prior marital home as her
homestead. In the meantime, the claimed homestead had been leased to
the wife's adult daughter and others, so that the wife would have funds to
meet mortgage payments on the house, and the house was later listed for
sale. When the tenants moved from the property about three weeks after
the wife's filing for bankruptcy, the wife and her husband moved into the
claimed homestead, where the wife testified she had always intended to
live.
Although the court carefully pointed out' 90 that a single person with-
out children of a particular marriage can maintain a homestead in the
property after divorce, 191 the court concluded that the wife's claim failed
because of the rule that a person cannot claim but one homestead at one
time. In this case, as of the date of her bankruptcy-filing, the court ob-
served that the wife had established that homestead in her third hus-
band's house. The court thus supplied a clearer reason for its conclusion
than is found in In re Claflin:192 that a single person who is temporarily
out of possession of an existing homestead and becomes a part of a family
dwelling in another homestead cannot maintain the prior homestead ex-
cept by showing an intention of the family to establish a homestead at the
former residence. 193 While there was some evidence in Claflin that the
wife agreed with her new husband that she could maintain her existing
homestead, there was no evidence that he moved there or that he gave up
his existing homestead with an intention of moving to his wife's home so
that it might be said that both were only temporarily removed from the
wife's existing homestead. In Brown there was no such evidence 194 and
in both instances the couple were living in the husband's existing resi-
dence at the time the petition for bankruptcy was filed.
In Coury v. Prot 95 the defendant appealed a federal district court's
order to turn over certain residential property to satisfy a judgment. His
defense was that though he had not occupied the house for several years,
it was still his homestead. The trial court had concluded, however, that
190. Id. at 101.
191. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50 (1876, as amended, 1973).
192. 761 F.2d 1088 (5th Cir. 1985), discussed in Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Hus-
band and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 1, 18-20 (1986).
193. Brown, 191 B.R. at 101. There were nevertheless dicta, id. at 101-02, in which the
court overstated its conclusion. The court suggested that it would be impossible for a per-
son to maintain a homestead, of which he or she is temporarily out of possession, if he or
she marries, and the new spouse, not living in a homestead, merely expresses an intent to
occupy the temporarily unused homestead. In that instance there is no need for the family
to prepare the old homestead for occupancy because the property is still a homestead,
though the owner is temporarily absent.
194. Id. at 102.
195. 85 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 1996).
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the defendant had abandoned the property as his homestead. When the
family moved from the property in 1991 they intended to return, although
they had acquired a new house in France and all of their residential be-
longings were installed there. The wife moved back to Texas from France
with the children for over a year in 1992-1993 but lived in another city.
The debtor-husband discontinued his Texas address in 1993. When the
husband's business kept him in France, the wife and children returned
there. Thus, when the turnover order was made in 1994, the family had
not resided in the house for three years. The Texas house had been
leased after the debtor's initial move to France in 1991. The debtor,
therefore, who had shifted all of his significant ties to France and main-
tained few if any ties to Texas, or the Texas house, had in fact abandoned
the property as his homestead. The appellate court found no clear error
in the district court's finding.196
In re Sandoval'97 involved a claim of a homestead to which the debtors
had moved after the filing of their Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition but
before their case's conversion to a proceeding under Chapter 7. Finding
that no policy reasons justify departure from the plain language of the
statute, 198 the court concluded that the debtors' right to the homestead
exemption has to be determined as of the date of the commencement of
the original Chapter 13 case rather than the date of conversion to a case
under Chapter 7.199
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with an overt assertion of
homestead denial in In re McDaniel.200 The debtor who was then occupy-
ing 165 rural acres as his home applied for a loan, for which he gave the
land as security. He nonetheless denied in writing that the property, ap-
parently the only real property he owned, was his homestead. In his later
bankruptcy the owner, nonetheless, claimed the rural acreage as his
homestead. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's ruling that the homeowner was not estopped under such circum-
stances to claim the property as his homestead. 201 Even if the same situa-
tion occurs today under the 1995 amendment to the Texas Constitution,
the same result would prevail. Even if the denial of homestead occu-
pancy is under oath, the homeowner's denial is not binding except when
he indicates that another property is his homestead.202
In McDaniel the court further held that the owner of the property, who
was then a widower, might claim a family homestead of up to 200 acres
rather than claim merely 100 acres as a single adult. The court so held
because the widower had occupied the property as a homestead as part of
196. Id. at 255.
197. 103 F.3d 20 (5th Cir. 1997).
198. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(b)(2)(A), 348(a) (1994).
-199. Sandoval, 103 F.3d at 22-23.
200. 70 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 1995).
201. Id. at 844.
202. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
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a family when his wife was still living. 20 3
In another bankruptcy dispute,2°4 the court held that a forced prepeti-
tion sale of a homestead, unrecorded (and thus unperfected) at the date
of bankruptcy, could be set aside by exercise of the trustee's avoiding
powers under the Bankruptcy Code.205 The court did not address the
further question whether on avoidance of the forced sale of the property
it could be claimed by the debtor as his homestead. Even if the debtor
was still in possession at the time of the sale and at the date of bank-
ruptcy, it would seem that he could not claim the property as his home-
stead because he did not own the property at the date of bankruptcy. 20 6
2. Proceeds of Homestead Sale
In In re Malone20 7 a bankruptcy court painstakingly clarified the pre-
cise meaning of the Texas statute that specifies that the proceeds of sale
of a homestead are exempt for "six months after the date of sale. '208 The
court concluded that the period runs from the date of sale through the
same day of the month six months hence. Thus, if the sale occurred on
November 21, 1995, the starting date for counting six months is Novem-
ber 22, and the proceeds of the sale are exempt through May 22, 1996 (all
24 hours of that day). The number of actual days during the six months is
irrelevant.
3. Descent of Homestead
The issue in National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Olson2°9 was whether
the homestead of an insolvent decedent's estate passed to his heirs free of
all debts. In addition to an adult married son, the divorced insolvent was
survived by a minor daughter who lived with her mother pursuant to her
parents' divorce decree and had been supported by her father, the dece-
dent. Under the Texas Constitution 210 and statutory law21' the home-
stead passes free of debt if the decedent is survived by a spouse, a minor
child, or an unmarried adult child residing with the family. It is not re-
quired that the minor child be residing in the homestead. 212 If there is a
surviving minor child, all the heirs take the homestead free of debts ex-
cept those for purchase money, unpaid taxes, and mechanics' work and
materials. 213 The rights of the heirs to take the property free of debts of
the decedent are not affected by the personal representative's subsequent
203. McDaniel, 70 F.3d at 844.
204. In re Elam, 194 B.R. 412 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1995).
206. See Joseph W. M'Knight, Prefiling Exemption Planning: A National Perspective in
JOSEPH NORTON, ET AL., REPRESENTING DEBTORS IN BANKRUPTCY 1 3.04 (1988).
207. 201 B.R. 175 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
208. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(c) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1997).
209. 920 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, n.w.h.).
210. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 52.
211. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 279 (Vernon 1980).
212. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 920 S.W.2d at 461.
213. Id at n.3.
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sale of the homestead property or its abandonment as such, although a
right of occupancy of the homestead by a family constituent will preclude
a partition of the property.214
4. Homestead Claimant's Assertion of Indigent-Rights for Appeal
With one judge dissenting, the Court of Criminal Appeals sitting en
banc in Newman v. State2 15 held that an intermediate appellate court
might reasonably conclude that a person appealing a conviction was not
entitled as an indigent to a court-compensated counsel and a free record
for appeal if he owned an equity in urban family residential homestead
and a business homestead as well as an equity in family personal property
exemptions. In denying the appellant's requests, the court below had
been aware of the fact that the prisoner had recently been adjudicated a
Chapter 7 bankrupt and his wife was operating the remnants of the busi-
ness to provide for their family.
F. LIENS ON HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
In In re Rebector2 16 the debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding
sued for damages and to set aside a lien arising under a retail installment
contract for home improvements under the Consumer Credit Code.217
Under such a contract, as statutorily defined, the consumer pays a credit-
price higher than the cash-price of what is bought so that the transaction
may be financed by a third person, who may lend the purchase money to
the buyer at interest. The latter transaction is outside the Consumer
Credit Code. In Rebector, however, the contractor-seller was also the
payee of a note for the price of the work done, although the note was
later assigned to a third person. Because the note was not given to the
third person, the court concluded that the transaction was subject to the
Consumer Credit Code.218 Thus, the lien on the debtors' realty under the
terms of the note was invalid under the code,219 and statutory damages
and attorney's fees were, therefore, recoverable by the debtor.
Another Chapter 13-debtor brought an adversary proceeding against
the Internal Revenue Service to challenge the validity of a federal tax lien
against his homestead. 220 In In re Sills22 1 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that although (1) a portion of the tax assessed was erroneously
214. Id. at 462.
215. 937 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996).
216. 192 B.R. 411 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995).
217. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 6.01-.10 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1997).
218. Rebector, 192 B.R. at 414 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069, § 6.02(15)
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1997)).
219. Id. There was no violation of the code in the agreed time-price differential be-
cause the 18 percent agreed differential is the upper limit allowed. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 5069, § 6.02(15) (Vernon 1987).
220. Both the husband and wife were debtors in the Chapter 13 proceeding, but the
challenge was made only by the husband in that the Revenue Service's claim was only
against the husband's one-half interest in the community house.
221. 82 F.3d 111 (5th Cir. 1996).
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identified in the notice of the federal tax lien as due for 1986 rather than
for 1983 taxes, and (2) the property was purchased with a workers' com-
pensation recovery exempt from seizure under the Revenue Code,222 the
lien was nonetheless valid. First, the court said that the minor defect in
the notice of lien was insufficient to make it void in light of the purpose of
filing to give constructive notice. 223 As to the homestead claim, the court
said that the tax lien does not constitute a seizure or a levy but only an
assertion of a security interest which does not violate the provisions of
the homestead exemption law.
In Benchmark Bank v. Crowder224 the Supreme Court of Texas consid-
ered a claim for equitable subrogation to a federal tax lien by the lender
of funds to discharge the federal lien. Reversing the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals denial of subrogation, the court concluded that the federal lien was
valid under the supremacy doctrine of the federal Constitution22 5 and
went a step further to hold that there is no significant difference between
the consequences of renewing a valid lien and borrowing money to dis-
charge a valid lien. The Dallas Court of Appeals had interposed the pro-
visions of the Texas Constitution226 to demonstrate the difference. 227 In
reversing the lower appellate court, the court held that "[h]omestead
owners must have the ability to renew, rearrange, and readjust the en-
cumbering obligation to prevent a loss of the homestead through foreclo-
sure.1228 This commercially convenient view had already prevailed in the
legislative proposal of the constitutional amendment narrowly approved
by the people in 1995.229 In conformity with the conclusion of the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Rodgers,2 30 however, the court
went on to conclude that the lienholder standing in the shoes of the fed-
eral government must compensate the non-taxpayer-wife, against whom
no lien had been filed, for her interest in the homestead when foreclosing
on its lien.2 31
G. BANKRUPTCY PREEMPTION OF TEXAS HOMESTEAD LAW
A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in In
re Davis232 that as a Texas homestead was liable for a non-dischargeable
222. I.R.C. § 6334(a)(7) (1994).
223. Sills, 82 F.3d at 113 (citing Richter Loan Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 753, 755
(5th Cir. 1956); In re Cennamo, 147 B.R. 540, 543 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1992)).
224. 919 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. 1996).
225. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
226. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 51.
227. Crowder v. Benchmark Bank, 889 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ),
noted in Joseph W. M'Knight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 48 SMU L. REV. 1225, 1252 (1995).
228. Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 661. See also id. at 662.
229. See Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 49 SMU L. REV. 1015, 1036-37 (1996) [hereinafter McKnight, 1996 Annual Survey].
230. 461 U.S. 677 (1983).
231. Benchmark Bank, 919 S.W.2d at 661-62.
232. 105 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 1997).
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obligation under the Bankruptcy Code. 233 Reversing the bankruptcy
court and the district court,234 the appellate court held that liability for
support obligations is plainly excepted under sections 522(c) and
523(a)(5) from the general rule of property exempted under section
522235 and the obligee for such liability may therefore proceed by ordi-
nary means to satisfy liability without having recourse to the Texas turno-
ver statute which specifically precludes that relief.236 The dissenting
judge relied principally on the absence of any remedy in the Bankruptcy
Code for enforcing liability.
H. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXEMPTIONS
In In re Leask237 a bankruptcy court explained that a bankrupt debtor
may voluntarily commit a portion of his income by a wage-withholding
order under a Chapter 13 plan, and thus the bankruptcy court's order to
the debtor's employer to withhold the debtor's current wages for remis-
sion to the bankruptcy trustee was not in violation of Texas's constitu-
tional prohibition of wage-garnishment. 238
Two recent cases dealt with claims of exempt tools of trade. In In re
Baldowski,239 the court followed the prevailing weight of authority that
tools of trade used in a debtor's trade or profession need not be pecu-
liarly adapted to that trade in order to be exempt under Texas law. 240
Thus the booths, china, glasses, and table utensils of the debtor's restau-
rant were properly classified as her exempt property.
In the other case,241 the debtor not only claimed his car as a tool of
trade and therefore exempt property but also sought removal of a non-
purchase-money lien thereon. There the court took a position contrary to
current trends and the liberal intent of the legislature in enacting the cur-
rent exemption laws. The court held the debtor-constable's car which he
used in his employment to serve summons of process was not exempt as a
tool of trade, although the court acknowledged that the use-test as ap-
plied in Baldowski2 42 is "[t]he current test for determining whether an
item [is] an exempt tool of trade in Texas .... ,,243 The court, neverthe-
less, concluded that "the [d]ebtor's use of the vehicle is too tenuous in
relation to his employment as a constable to justify avoidance of [the] lien
on the vehicle. In other words, this car is not 'necessary' to his alleged
233. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(c), 523(a)(5) (1995).
234. In re Davis, 170 B.R. 892, 898 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1994), affd, 188 B.R. 544 (N.D.
Tex. 1995), commented on in McKnight, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 229.
235. Davis, 1105 F.3d at 1019-20.
236. Id. at 1023.
237. 194 B.R. 416 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).
238. Id. at 418 (citing TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 28).
239. 191 B.R. 102 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
240. Id. at 104 (citing In re Legg, 164 B.R. 69, 73 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1994)).
241. In re Erwin, 199 B.R. 628 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1996).
242. Baldowski, 191 B.R. at 104.
243. Erwin, 199 B.R. at 630. The court also stated that it was following the use-test as
laid down in In re Legg, 164 B.R. at 69. Id. at 631.
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trade-any car would be adequate."' 2 " The court's conclusion is simply
incomprehensible. 245
Another pair of bankruptcy courts were also in disagreement concern-
ing exemptions of interests in insurance policies. In In re Borchers246
Judge Clark reached the accepted conclusion that the broader exemption
provided by the 1991 amendment to the Insurance Code247 prevails over
the narrower amendments to the Property Code 248 passed at the same
legislative session. The legislative history of the Insurance Code amend-
ment 249 makes this point clear. It should also be noted that the two bills
were drawn by different draftsmen and that the draftsman of the Property
Code amendments was unaware of the proposals for amending the Insur-
ance Code until after the committee hearings on his bill. Judge Clark's
suggestions for amendment of the Property Code250 should be promptly
enacted.
In In re Scott25 1 the court agreed that the Property Code needs prompt
amendment2 52 but nevertheless concluded that until amended the Prop-
erty Code provision's must be given effect by keeping life insurance poli-
cies within the value limitation provided in section 42.001.253
As a matter of federal exemption law (unaffected by Texas law) the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held in In re Carmichae254 that the right
to receive payments from an individual retirement account (IRA) that
gives the owner the right to receive payments under federal law after
attaining the age of 591h is exempt property under bankruptcy law2 55
although the IRA also allows receipt of payments prior to that age on
payment of a penalty tax that is applicable to any IRA, even if the provi-
sion for paying the penalty is omitted from the document creating the
IRA. The court went on to say that the provisions of the Bankruptcy
244. Id.
245. Commenting on the specific reference to "motor vehicles" used in a trade or pro-
fession added in 1991 to TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(2) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1997),
the court stated that "adding an exemption for automobiles was not intended to allow
debtors with vehicles having only a remote, or even a moderate nexus with their trade or
profession to avoid a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money lien via the bankruptcy process."
Erwin, 199 B.R. at 631. But defining or redefining property as exempt under state law
automatically brings that property within the purview of 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B)(ii) (1995)
for avoidance of such liens. That is simply the effect of the Bankruptcy Code itself. The
court's point could be that the lien predated the 1991 amendment but the facts of the cases
as related in the opinion do not so state.
246. 192 B.R. 698 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
247. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.22, § I (Vernon Supp. 1997).
248. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002 (12) (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1997).
249. See Borchers, 192 B.R. at 704-05.
250. See id. at 705 n.13.
251. 193 B.R. 805 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
252. Id. at 811.
253. Id. at 811-12 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.001 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1997)).
254. 100 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 1996).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (d)(10)(E) (1995). The court thus interpreted the phrase "debtor's
right to receive a payment under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, annuity, or similar
plan or contract" to include payments from IRAs.
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Code256 that give the bankruptcy court power to limit the right to receive
exempt payments "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor and any dependent of the debtor" provide an effective means
of restricting use of exempt funds to avoid abuse of the exemption.257
In allowing a debtor to remove a creditor's nonpossessory, nonpur-
chase-money lien from exempt farm equipment in In re White,258 the
bankruptcy court held that the creditor was not entitled to assert that the
interest had become a "possessory" interest merely because the creditor
had exercised a contractual right to take possession of the equipment fol-
lowing the debtor's default in payment of his obligation.
IV. DISPOSITION OF MARITAL PROPERTY ON DIVORCE
A. DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
1. Jurisdiction
In Dankowski v. Dankowsk2 59 the husband appealed from a decree of
divorce on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over
him as a non-domiciliary who had not been served with process in Texas
and as one who lacked minimum contacts with the state. He had not
appeared at the trial, but a plea to the jurisdiction under Rule 120a 260 had
been made on his behalf at the outset of the trial and had been overruled
by the court. His fatal error was in filing a motion for new trial, which
constituted a general appearance.
2. Recusal
A motion for recusal must comply with Rule 18,261 requiring a verified
statement of the grounds for recusal. In McElwee v. MCElwee262 a motion
was made to the presiding judge to recuse himself. The presiding judge's
associate judge, who does not appear to have considered the matter, had
in years past been employed by his father who had represented the wife
in a previous suit. Thus, it was argued in favor of the husband's motion
for recusal of the presiding judge that the latter was tainted by the associ-
ate judge's father's prior representation. Under these circumstances the
associate judge would have been disqualified from hearing the matter,
but the facts do not constitute grounds for disqualification of the presid-
ing judge. 263 The court did not comment concerning recusal of the pre-
siding judge because the motion for recusal was improperly made.264
256. 11 U.S.C. § 522 (d)(10)(E) (1995).
257. Carmichael, 100 F.3d at 380.
258. 203 B.R. 613, 616-17 (Bankr. N. D. Tex. 1996).
259. 922 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ requested).
260. TEx. R. Civ. P. 120a.
261. TEX. R. Civ. P. 18a.





3. Associate Judge's Findings in Writing and Notice of Appeal from
Findings
In Robles v. Robles2 65 the First Court of Appeals concluded that a
docket sheet entry is sufficient to constitute a written record of findings
for an appeal from an associate judge's recommendations. 266 Further, for
the purpose of appeal an objection to the associate judge's conclusions
must be filed prior to their being adopted by the presiding judge.
4. Correction of Judgement Nunc Pro Tunc
If a court enters a judgment containing a clerical error, the court may
correct the error nunc pro tunc.267 In Newsom v. Petrilli2 68 an ex-wife
brought suit in 1994 for a share of her ex-husband's employment benefits
which she asserted had been awarded to her in their 1988 divorce. The
decree prepared by the ex-wife's attorney had provided that the "Re-
spondent's employment benefits" be divided between the parties. The
respondent in the divorce, however, was the wife who had no employ-
ment benefits to divide. To correct the judgment the court substituted the
word "Petitioner's" for "Respondent's." The initial error had not re-
sulted from judicial reasoning or determination and was, therefore, a cler-
ical error and not a judicial error.2 69
In DeLaup v. DeLaup2 70 the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals
went very considerably further in approving a nunc pro tunc entry of
judgment. The couple had reached a settlement of all issues incident to
their divorce and testified to their terms of their agreement in open court.
The agreement was then transcribed by the court reporter, and the judge
approved its terms. A decree prepared by the husband's attorney was
then signed by the judge. Almost six months after the trial court had lost
plenary jurisdiction under Rule 329b,271 the ex-wife filed a motion to en-
tered a revised judgment nunc pro tunc or to reform the judgment. The
decree had omitted several significant elements of the agreement includ-
ing a provision for contractual alimony for the wife and detailed provi-
sions for custody of the children. The court granted the motion and the
ex-husband appealed. The Fourteenth District Court held that the agree-
ment dictated into the record by the parties constructively complied with
the provisions of Rule 11272 (requiring that the agreement be in writing
and signed by the parties2 73) and the statute of frauds (requiring that a
265. No. 01-94-00367-CV, 1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3412 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Aug. 8, 1996, no writ) (not released for publication).
266. Id. at *12.
267. TEX. R. Qv. P. 316.
268. 919 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, no writ).
269. Id. at 483.
270. 917 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
271. TEX. R. Ov. P. 329b(d).
272. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
273. DeLaup, 917 S.W.2d at 413 (citing McLendon v. McLendon, 847 S.W.2d 601, 608
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied)).
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contract be in writing if not to be performed within one year). 274 Because
the alimony provisions of the contract could have been performed within
one year, the agreement without actual writing and signatures was sus-
tained.275 The court held alternatively that the agreement measured up
to the standards of an enforceable judgment and thus avoided the stric-
tures of the statute of frauds.276
5. Support and Attorney's Fees
In Ex parte Kimsey277 the El Paso Court of Appeals commented on
the statutory obligation to supply necessaries pending trial and, thus, fur-
ther clarified the basis for awards for interim attorney's fees. On the hus-
band's failure to respond to the court's order to pay $50,000 into the
registry of the court for additional attorney's fees, the wife filed a motion
that the husband be held in contempt. Finding that he had $20,000 in
community funds available, the trial court ordered the husband jailed un-
til he paid. At his habeas corpus hearing, the husband did not argue his
inability to pay but that he was being imprisoned for debt contrary to the
Texas Constitution. 278 Relying on Ex parte Hall,2 79 the court repeated
the familiar doctrine that the duty of familial support is not a debt "within
Article I, Section 18, but a legal duty." Hence, an order to discharge that
duty is enforceable by civil contempt.280
Grossnickle v. Grossnickel281 was an appeal from a new trial for divi-
sion of property on remand from a prior appeal. Because there was no
appeal on the issue of the divorce itself, however, the court held that the
ex-wife was not entitled to an order for support pending appeal because
no appeal was taken on the divorce,282 though an order for support has
been allowed when the divorce itself is appealed. 283
By way of dicta the court went on to overemphasize limitations on or-
ders for payment of attorney's fees.284 The confusion stems from the
Texas Supreme Court's decision in Carle v. Carle285 where the court dealt
with orders for the payment of attorney's fees as ordinarily related to
274. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1987).
275. DeLaup, 917 S.W.2d at 414 (citing International Piping v. M.M. White, 831 S.W.2d
444, 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Winograd v. Willis, 789
S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1990, writ denied)).
276. DeLaup, 917 S.W.2d at 414 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1987); McLendon, 847 S.W.2d at 608; Giles v. Giles, 830 S.W.2d 232, 238
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ)).
277. 915 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1995, no writ).
278. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 181.
279. 854 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1993).
280. Kimsey, 915 S.W.2d at 526.
281. 935 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ).
282. Id. at 848.
283. See In re Joiner, 755 S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988), modified on
reh'g on the other grounds, 766 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1988, no writ).
284. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d at 847.
285. 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950).
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division of property on divorce. In numerous later instances,286 however,
the intermediate appellate courts have not read the language in Carle as
laying down a comprehensive rule for allowance of attorney's fees to pre-
clude an order that a spouse pay the other spouse's attorney's fees as an
element of necessaries in an appropriate case. As long ago established, 287
one spouse's bringing suit against the other for divorce allows the court to
fix an obligation on the petitioner to discharge necessary costs as an ele-
ment of support from any source as a personal obligation.
6. Preservation of Property Pending Appeal
In Grossnickle288 the court also relied on statutory authority defining
the power to make temporary orders for preservation of property within
thirty days after the perfection of an appeal.289 Hence, the trial court's
subsequent order to limit the ex-wife's access to community assets was
void.290
7. Appeal: Acceptance of Benefits as Waiver of Defective Service
In Bloom v. Bloom 291 the wife appealed by writ of error from a decree
of divorce on the grounds of defective service of process. The San
Antonio Court of Appeals held that any defects in personal service was
cured by the appellant's acceptance of benefits of property division, relief
from debt, and payments for child support. Her appeal was not brought
under the narrow exception that the benefits accepted could not be af-
fected by the success of the appeal.292
8. Appeal: Effect of Bankruptcy Filing
In Chunn v. Chunn293 a divorce had been filed in 1990. The commu-
nity assets at issue included an interest in a corporation, which was a
party defendant. Prior to the entry of the decree, the corporation filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. Four months later the bankruptcy
court lifted the stay of proceedings 294 only as to the trial proceeding, and
the divorce-court then rendered judgment. The husband and the corpo-
ration then perfected their appeals. The initial question before the appel-
late court was whether the husband's filing of an appeal violated the
286. See Capellan v. Capellan, 888 S.W.2d 539, 544 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ de-
nied); Chiles v. Chiles, 779 8.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
denied). See also Joseph W. McKnight, Family Law: Husband and Wife, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 47 SMU L. REV. 1161, 1190 (1994).
287. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.59 (Vernon 1993).
288. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d at 850.
289. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.58(h) (Vernon 1993).
290. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d at 850. The court also struck down the trial court's order
that the wife make no comments in criticism of the court and its officers, id. at 851, as a
denial of her rights of free speech.
291. 935 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
292. Id. at 945-48 (citing Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 234 S.W.2d 1002 (1950)).
293. 929 S.W.2d 490 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, n.w.h.).
294. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1995).
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automatic bankruptcy stay. The appellate court held that the husband's
papers filed to pursue his appeal merely constituted prematurely filed
documents, which had no effect during the automatic stay295 that was sub-
sequently lifted as to the appellate proceedings.296
9. Appeal: Findings and Conclusions
If findings of fact and conclusions of law are properly requested, the
trial court must make such findings.297 If an appeal is taken and the
court's failed to make the findings requested, the appellate court should
abate the appeal and direct the trial court to correct its error.298 There
are, however, some exceptions to this rule. If it is apparent from the rec-
ord that the party complaining of a lack of findings and conclusions suf-
fered no harm, the appeal need not be abated. For example, in Tenery v.
Tenery299 where it was complained the trial court erred in making a dis-
proportionate division of community property, the appellate court found
that there was sufficient evidence in the record for the trial court to make
such an appeal and thus that the appeal did not need not to be abated for
lack findings and conclusions. In Zieba v. Martin,300 moreover, there was
no fact in dispute because for the purpose of determining reimbursement
the wife-appellant sought to rely on the husband's valuations, which were
in the record. Hence, no abatement was necessary to allow findings to be
made.
10. Bill of Review
Only the court rendering a decree of divorce or a higher court may
properly modify that decree. Hence, an equitable bill of review to set
aside the judgment must be brought in the same court that rendered the
decree.30'
B. PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
1. Reaching an Agreement
In providing generally that an agreed judgment must be reduced to
writing and signed by the parties, the draftsman of Rule 11302 perhaps
failed to perceive that such broad language, coupled with the established
295. Chunn, 929 S.W.2d at 493.
296. Id. at 494.
297. TEX. R. Civ. P. 297. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772
(Tex. 1989).
298. TEX. R. App. P. 81(a). See Cherne Indus., Inc., 763 S.W.2d at 773.
299. 935 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no writ); see also Garcia v. Garcia,
No. 13-95-329-CV, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 112 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi, Jan. 9, 1997,
n.w.h.) (not designated for publication) (lack of findings and conclusions was harmless
error and complainant was able to present her case without them in a child support modifi-
cation case).
300. 928 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
301. Pursley v. Ussery, 937 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ).
302. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11. "Unless otherwise provided in these rules, no agreement be-
tween attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writ-
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habits of judges and lawyers in familial disputes, would open the way to
an intermitable succession of appellate squabbles on the compliance with
that broad language. In almost every reported dispute concerning such
agreed judgments the courts have nevertheless held that compliance with
the broad terms of the rule has been achieved.
In Clanin v. Clanin30 3 the trial judge signed a brief manuscript order
that had been signed by the parties. The order stated that the parties had
agreed to terms of settlement which had been recorded by the court re-
porter. Although the husband later asserted that he had withdrawn his
consent to the agreement prior to rendition of judgment, that assertion
was evidently a fabrication. 30 4 Although the record was apparently silent
on some terms included in the formal decree, the appellate court treated
these embellishments as reflecting the exercise of judicial power under
section 3.63.305 But how those terms were conformed to the record is not
revealed in the appellate opinion. In one instance, apparently because
the terms of the formal decree with respect to filing an income tax return
actually conflicted with the agreement recorded, the appellate court re-
manded the decree for correction by the trial court. The trial and appel-
late process exemplified here is one of casual inattention to detail in
response to a rule that may be insufficiently tailored to the realities of
practice of family law.
Further evidence of apparent misunderstanding of the process of
reaching an agreed judgment is illustrated by In re McIntosh.30 6 There
the parties, unaccompanied by counsel, met with a mediator and emerged
with a draft of agreement, which they were to submit to their attorneys
for review, after which, all concerned were to gather with the mediator
within ten days to complete the agreement. Fifteen days later, the wife's
attorney advised the mediator that the wife had decided not to accept the
proposed agreement. Following the provisions of section 3.631,307 the
trial court refused to treat the renounced proposed draft as agreed and
the husband appealed. As a consequence, the time of the appellate court
was wasted by a virtually frivolous appeal, as the Amarillo court indi-
cated by allowing this decision to be reported. Whether there was a bind-
ing contract to mediate in that instance is not clear. That there was no
mediated agreement in that instance was perfectly clear.308
ing, signed and filed with the papers as part of the record, or unless it be made in open
court and entered of record."
303. 918 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
304. Id. at 677.
305. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon 1993).
306. 918 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, no writ).
307. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.631 (Vernon 1993).
308. Davis v. Wickham, 917 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1996, no
writ), was a somewhat similar appeal involving the repudiation of an attempted mediation
of a child-custody modification suit.
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2. Terms of the Agreement
Disputes with respect to terms agreed and their enforceability are dis-
tinct from those with respect to whether any agreement was reached. In
Buys v. Buys30 9 the Texas Supreme Court considered the effect of a resid-
uary provision of a property settlement agreement incorporated in a pre-
McCarty3MO divorce decree covering property that included the husband's
military retirement benefits. The specific terms of the agreement made
no mention of those benefits but in the residuary clause provided that all
property of the parties not specifically set aside to the husband would
belong to the wife. In MCarty the United States Supreme Court later
held on June 25, 1981 that military retirement benefits belonged to a pen-
sioner alone.3 11 Within fifteen months Congress passed the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982312 (effective February 1,
1983) to provide that such benefits should be divided on divorce under
state law. In order to preclude further state court divisions of military
retirement benefits not treated in pre-McCarty divorces, Congress pro-
vided in 1990 that
A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding to
divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the
property of the member and the member's spouse or former spouse
if a final decree of divorce... (including a court.., approved prop-
erty settlement incident to such decree) ... was issued before June
25, 1981, and.., did not treat ... any amount of retired pay of the
member as property of the member and the member's spouse or for-
mer spouse.313
This statute seems to preclude all further attempts to divide military re-
tirement benefits left undivided in pre-McCarty cases. This result was
early indicated by the Texas Supreme Court in Cameron v. Cameron314
and seemingly adhered to by that court in refusing a writ of error in Pow-
ell v. Powell.315
The San Antonio Court of Appeals, from which the appeal in Buys was
taken, had interpreted the 1990 congressional amendment to mean that
only those decisions that specifically dealt with military retirement inter-
ests are covered by the 1990 amendment. Those that treated such bene-
fits specifically were, of course, covered by MCarty. In reversing the
court below, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the 1990 amend-
ment was not meant to address pre-McCarty cases resting on an applica-
tion of state law, that is, the terms of the property settlement agreement,
apart from any judicial intervention. Regrettably, such cases seem to
309. 924 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. 1996).
310. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
311. Id. at 235.
312. Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 730 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1)
(1983)). See McKnight, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 229 at 1023-24.
313. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1).
314. 641 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1982).
315. 703 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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have been precisely what Congress meant to provide and may have been
a consequence of the constitutional posture of the McCarty case. Specifi-
cally, "[a] court may not treat retired pay as property ... if a final decree
of divorce ... (including a court ... approved property settlement inci-
dent to such decree) ... was issued before June 25, 1981, and ... did not
treat ... any amount of retired pay. .... ,,316 The pre-McCarty trial court
in Buys had not specifically mentioned retired pay, as a result of the gen-
eral terms of the property settlement agreement. Although one would
like to agree with the court's conclusion and the intricate arguments that
prompted it, that result seems precluded by the statute.
Very different concerns were before the Fort Worth appellate court in
Fryman v. Fryman.317 There, the couple's property settlement provided
for support and custody of their children and that the husband would pay
the wife $1,000 a month until her remarriage, death, or filing "on her
behalf or on the behalf of the children any modification suit concerning"
child support or custody. After the ex-wife brought suit to modify some
provisions as to custody, the ex-husband sought a declaratory judgment
that his obligation to pay contractual alimony was extinguished. The
court granted the declaratory judgment sought by the ex-husband and the
ex-wife appealed. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the provi-
sion for termination of alimony payments as a consequence of bringing
suit concerning the best interest of the children 318 interfered with the au-
thority of the court in that regard and was therefore contrary to public
policy and void. 319
In Cavazos v. Cavazos,320 two minor children through their mother as
next friend brought suit against their father to enforce a trust which they
alleged was created by their father on their behalf as part of the parents'
property settlement. The agreement itself referred to and incorporated
by reference four schedules with respect to the couple's assets and liabili-
ties. An unsigned fifth schedule provided that stock of the husband's
business would be held in trust for the children. The fifth unsigned sched-
ule was not incorporated by the terms of the agreement but was filed with
the court, although not referred to in the court's decree. The appellate
court agreed with the trial court that the alleged trust was not enforceable
as part of the contractual agreement as it was not incorporated into the
agreement by the parties or by the court.321
316. 10 U.S.C. 1408(c)(1) (1995).
317. 926 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
318. Three prior cases dealing with child support had reached the same conclusion: Le-
onard v. Lane, 821 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Hill v.
Hill, 819 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied); Hoffman v. Hoffman, 805
S.W.2d 848 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
319. Fryman, 926 S.W.2d at 605-06.




C. MAKING THE DIVISION
In Dankowski v. Dankowski322 the divorce court accorded no signifi-
cance to a property settlement agreement entered into in connection with
a void Taiwanese divorce, and the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed
that conclusion.323 The appellate court reiterated the subsisting rule that
Texas divorce courts will not divide foreign realty except to the extent of
ordering a party over whom the court has in personam jurisdiction to
make a conveyance. 324
In making the ultimate divisions of community property in Grossnickle
v. Grossnickle,325 the court held that the spouse in possession of property
was responsible for its deterioration in value due to neglect. All too often
divorce courts tend to gloss over culpable inattention to marital property
that is allowed to deteriorate in the course of the breakdown of a mar-
riage. The appellate court's sensitivity to this point sets a much needed
general standard for trial courts. By contrast, however, the appellate
court, nevertheless, seemed too much inclined to exonerate the divorce
court's failure to consider future federal tax consequences in making a
property division. 326 The same casual attitude toward ignorance of vital
aspects of the federal tax law was expressed by the same court in Harris v.
Holland,327 where the later consequences of dividing high basis and low
basis assets was in issue. Although undue importance should not be
made of this point and the Texarkana court's warning against inordinate
emphasis on speculation and surmise3 28 should not be ignored, federal
tax consequences of property division should not be casually disregarded.
In Grossnickle,329 the Texarkana court reasonably excused the trial
court's almost inevitable failure to adhere to a consistent use of the value
of assets at the date of divorce when making the division on remand at a
much later time. Although the appellate court found errors in computa-
tion of the value of the community estate that, at most, could have
amounted to an additional three percent of the total, the division was
regarded as not so disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of
discretion. 330
In addition to very significant community rights of reimbursements
which the trial court overlooked in making the division on divorce, the
appellate court is Zeiba v. Martin331 sensed a general abuse of discretion
in making an excessively favorable property division in favor of the hus-
322. 922 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
323. Id. at 304.
324. Id. at 303.
325. 935 S.W.2d at 846.
326. Id. at 847-48.
327. 867 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, no writ).
328. Grossnickle, 935 S.W.2d at 847.
329. Id. at 837.
330. Id at 851.
331. 928 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ).
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band. 332 The appellate court also found an unreconcilable conflict in the
amount of attorney's fees awarded to the wife that required remand. 333
Zieba, however, was a somewhat unusual instance of wayward trial dispo-
sition. In Farley v. Farley,334 before the Eastland court on grounds similar
to Zieba, the court found no abuse of discretion in making the property
division but found an insufficiency of evidence to determine the reasona-
bleness of attorney's and expert's fees awarded. The wife's sole evidence
on such matters was insufficient. 335
D. ENFORCEMENT
Ex parte Waldrep336 presented a situation which does not often occur.
The contemnor-wife did not argue that the court's order was in any sense
ambiguous or equivocal but that it was merely oral. The court had or-
dered the wife to deliver a particular car to a specific place at a specific
time, but the order was not in writing and the wife failed to obey it. The
majority of the court, nevertheless, held that the merely oral order was
invalid. 337
Ex parte Swate338 involved a protracted effort on the part of an ex-wife
to recover a very large judgment from her prior husband, who had remar-
ried and was later divorced from his subsequent wife. A receiver had
been appointed at the instance of the first wife and the receiver had got
an order against the second wife to "turn over any funds she received
from the [divorce court]." On the second wife's failure to comply, she
was found in contempt and ordered to pay the specific sum of $10,000 to
the receiver and a specific fine to the court. In making the commitment
order without a further hearing, the court added that she should also
make "suitable payment arrangements" to the receiver for over $53,000.
The Texas Supreme Court held that the commitment order was void for
lack of procedural due process. 339 In a concurring opinion, Justice Gon-
zalez went further in saying that the court also lacked authority to make
the turnover order because a judgment had not been rendered against the
second wife or someone under her control.340
A 1988 decree of divorce in In re Wyly 34 1 had ordered sale of certain
realty and division of the proceeds between the parties. If the parties
could not later agree on a sales price, it was further provided that a re-
332. Id. at 791. A suggestion of abuse of discretion in a post-divorce division of undi-
vided assets in Forgason v. Forgason, 911 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1995, writ
denied) as noted in McKnight, 1996 Annual Survey, supra note 229 at 1055-56, could not be
resolved because of an inadequate record of property values.
333. Zeiba, 928 S.W.2d at 791.
334. Farley v. Farley, 930 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1996, no writ).
335. Id. at 213-14.
336. 932 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ).
337. Id. at 741.
338. 922 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. 1996).
339. Id. at 125.
340. Id.
341. 934 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ requested).
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ceiver would be appointed. After unsuccessful efforts of the parties to
sell the property within a year of the decree, the ex-husband moved for
appointment of a receiver, but that motion was not acted on by the court,
and the parties continued unsuccessfully to attempt to sell the property.
In 1995 the ex-husband sought enforcement of the decree and reiterated
his motion for appointment of a receiver. The ex-wife asserted that the
ex-husband's motion was barred by the statute of limitation. Affirming
the order of the trial court, the Amarillo Court of Appeals concluded that
the original motion for appointment of a receiver was timely and because
it had not been acted on by the court, the reiteration of the motion was
also timely. 342
Following common usage, the divorce court in Soto v. Soto34 3 awarded
to each spouse the property in his or her possession. At the time, the
husband had actual control of real property, the title of which stood in
the names of both spouses. In her subsequent suit for partition of the
property as undivided, the ex-wife asserted that because her name was on
the deed, she was also in possession of the property as a matter of law.
The El Paso Court of Appeals rejected this assertion. The court went on
to say that in the context of divorce decrees (except as to retirement ben-
efits), possession of property means physical control of the property or
the power to achieve its immediate enjoyment. 344
The argument advanced by the ex-wife in Sanderlin v. Sanderlin345 was
also untenable. After the wife filed suit for divorce, the husband made a
beneficiary-designation of his Texas governmental retirement benefits in
favor of his wife. In a property settlement agreement later incorporated
in the divorce decree, however, all rights in the husband's retirement ben-
efits was awarded to him. The ex-husband died soon after the divorce,
not having changed the beneficiary-designation. The ex-wife claimed the
retirement benefits, which had been almost wholly the husband's sepa-
rate property. Despite the terms of the settlement agreement, the ex-wife
relied on Government Code section 824.101(d), 346 which provides that
"except as otherwise provided by law" a beneficiary designation of a
Texas governmental retirement benefit controls, and Family Code section
3.633(e), 347 which provides that its terms do not apply to benefits under
the Texas public retirement system. Under the terms of the property set-
tlement agreement, however, the effect of these provisions is that the con-
tract supersedes the earlier beneficiary-designation. 348
In Fraser v. Fraser,349 the ex-husband, prior to his bankruptcy, had
342. Id. at 177 (citing Hicks v. First Nat'l Bank, 778 S.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1989, writ denied)).
343. 936 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no writ).
344. Id. at 343.
345. 929 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied).
346. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 824.101(d) (Vernon 1987).
347. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.633(e) (Vernon 1993).
348. Sanderlin, 929 S.W.2d at 123-124.
349. 196 B.R. 371 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1996).
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been ordered by a Connecticut divorce court to pay interest on funds
appropriated by him from a family estate that his ex-wife was obligated to
repay as executrix. The bankruptcy court held that this order of the di-
vorce court constituted an alimony award to the ex-wife and was there-
fore not dischargeable under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(5). 350
A recently reported bankruptcy case illustrates application of the 1994
amendment to section 523(a)(15) of the Bankruptcy Code. 351 Under that
amendment a bankruptcy court may determine that the benefits to a
debtor-obligor may outweigh the detriments to the payee under a divorce
decree so that the decreed obligation is dischargeable in the debtor's
bankruptcy. In In re Gamble352 the bankruptcy court held that the debtor
had had the ability to pay a $100,000 note agreed to be discharged in
settlement of the 1990 divorce and his financial condition was improved
at the date of bankruptcy, the time for determination of ability to pay
under Bankruptcy Code section 523(a)(15)(A). Neither of the ex-
spouses, however, were in comfortable financial circumstances. The
court held that the benefit of allowing a discharge to the debtor ex-hus-
band did not outweigh the detriment to the ex-wife. 353
E. OTHER POST-DIVORCE DISPUTES
Several recent disputes were very peripheral to the concerns of both
spouses. In Votzmeyer v. United States354 a taxpayer-ex-husband was de-
nied alimony-treatment of payments made to his former wife under the
Internal Revenue Code.355 The couple was divorced in 1985 and a provi-
sion for contractual alimony was made a part of the divorce decree. In
1986, when the ex-husband become a bankrupt, his ex-wife successfully
contested his attempt to discharge the debt. The bankruptcy court found
that the debt was "in the nature of alimony" under the Bankruptcy
Code.356 The United States was not a party to that particular dispute,
although it was a creditor in the bankruptcy and had notice of the matter.
In 1985 and from 1987 through 1990, the ex-husband deducted his con-
tracted payments to his ex-wife from his gross income in his annual fed-
eral income tax returns and the ex-wife included the amounts received as
part of her taxable income. The Revenue Service disallowed the ex-hus-
band's deduction, and he sought a declaratory judgment sustaining his
position. Although the federal district court concluded that it lacked sub-ject matter jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgement in this case,357 it
went on to express the opinion that although the bankruptcy court de-
cided the alimony issue for bankruptcy purposes, the finding was not con-
350. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1995).
351. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15) (1995).
352. 196 B.R. 54 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
353. Gamble, 196 B.R. at 58.
354. 202 B.R. 235 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
355. 26 U.S.C. § 71 (1995).
356. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) (1995).
357. Votzmeyer, 202 B.R. at 236.
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trolling for federal tax purposes. 358 Although the Tax Reform Act of
1986359 removed the requirement that an effective alimony provision
must terminate on the death of the receiving spouse, that act did not ap-
ply to earlier divorce decrees. Hence, the 1985 decree that did not specify
termination on the payee's death did not allow payments to qualify for
tax deductibility.
Three appellate cases dealt with disputes between divorced spouses
and their attorneys. One malpractice case 360 was defeated both by the
failure to prove causation and by failure to be brought within the statute
of limitation.361 In another,362 it was asserted that a cause of action as-
serted by a bankrupt ex-husband against his attorney was an asset of his
bankruptcy estate. The bankruptcy court held that although the repre-
sentation of the client occurred prior to the bankruptcy, the alleged loss
accrued after the bankruptcy filing and thus the cause of action was not
an asset of the bankruptcy estate.363 The third case 364 involved a bank-
rupt-attorney against whom a judgment for malpractice had been ren-
dered prior to his bankruptcy, and the judgment debt had been
discharged. The bankruptcy court, however, allowed the creditor-client
to proceed on the bankrupt's behalf with a malpractice claim in state
court against his former lawyer's attorney but without the bankrupt-law-
yer's consent. A summary judgement granted in favor of the defendant-
attorney was affirmed by the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals, say-
ing that a Texas creditor does not have an interest in his debtor's unas-
serted legal malpractice claim.365 In this instance, the bankrupt-lawyer
had not asserted the claim because he was satisfied with his
representation. 366
358. Id. at 237.
359. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as I.R.C. § 1843(c)(2) (1986)).
360. Hall v. Stephenson, 919 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ denied).
361. Id. at 468.
362. In re Swift, 198 B.R. 927 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996).
363. Id. at 937.
364. Dauter-Clouse v. Robinson, 936 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1996, n.w.h.).
365. Id. at 332.
366. Id. One is reminded of White v. InteCom, Inc., No. 93-94-00394-CV (Tex. App.-
Austin Sept. 13, 1995, writ denied) (not designated for publication), noted in McKnight,
1996 Annual Survey, supra note 229, at 1030, which involved an ex-husband's ineffective
assignment of any potential claim for malpractice he might have against his lawyers
notwithstanding that he asserted that he was well satisfied by their representation.
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